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ANTI-INNOVATION NORMS 
Stephanie Plamondon Bair and Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña 
ABSTRACT—Intellectual property (IP) scholars have recently turned their 
attention to social norms—informal rules that emerge from and are enforced 
by nonhierarchically organized social forces—as a promising way to spur 
innovation in communities as diverse as the fashion industry and the open-
source software movement. The narrative that has emerged celebrates social 
norms’ ability to solve IP’s free-rider problem without incurring IP’s costs. 
But this account does not fully consider the dark side of social norms. 
In fact, certain social norms, when overenforced, can create substantial 
barriers to the most socially beneficial creative pursuits. Because IP scholars 
have left unexplored how social norms can hinder innovation in this way, the 
harm they cause has gone unmitigated. 
This Article sheds light on the dark side of innovation norms. It coins 
the term “anti-innovation norms” to label these counterproductive social 
forces. Using the double lens of sociology and psychology, it gives a full 
theoretical account of three types of anti-innovation norms: research priority, 
methodology, and evaluation norms—all of which interfere with socially 
beneficial boundary-crossing innovation. 
Our elucidation of anti-innovation norms has both theoretical and 
policy implications. On the theory side, it suggests that IP scholars to date 
have been too focused on addressing the free-rider problem. This has caused 
them to overlook other barriers to innovation, like those posed by the set of 
anti-innovation norms we describe here. This focus on free riding may also 
help explain why innovation and norms scholars have paid little attention to 
debates within the broader literature on law and social norms concerned with 
identifying situations in which social norms are welfare reducing. On the 
policy side, it points to innovation dilemmas that IP is not fully equipped to 
solve. While changes to the IP doctrines of attribution and fair use in 
copyright and nonobviousness in patent law can counteract anti-innovation 
norms at the margin, a comprehensive solution requires innovation scholars 
to broaden their vision beyond the IP toolkit. We take the first steps in this 
direction, proposing a number of interventions, including novel funding 
regimes and tax credits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Innovation drives economic growth and is key to creating prosperous 
societies.1 Much of the legal scholarship on innovation focuses on the role of 
formal intellectual property (IP) law in promoting it.2 More recently, 
 
 1 See, e.g., Benjamin Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 
61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 690 & n.73 (2014) (linking more innovation to greater social welfare). 
 2 See, e.g., John M. Golden, Robert P. Merges & Pamela Samuelson, The Path of IP Studies: Growth, 
Diversification, and Hope, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1757, 1758 (2014) (“Focus on information and innovation 
inevitably leads to concern with intellectual property.”). 
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however, IP scholars have begun to examine the role that nonlegal factors, 
and social norms in particular, play in innovative communities.3  
The bulk of the existing scholarship on social norms and innovation 
concerns IP’s “negative space”: innovative communities where creativity 
flourishes despite a lack of formal IP protection.4 The upshot of this 
groundbreaking literature is that social norms can, under the right conditions, 
promote innovation by regulating copying behavior—a task traditionally 
accomplished by formal IP rights. Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman’s 
study of the fashion industry, for instance, highlights how innovation in 
fashion design “flourishes despite a near-total lack of protection.”5 They 
posit that a norm of tolerating copying behaviors leads to a fast fashion cycle 
that generates markets for new designs.6 In the world of high cuisine, 
Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von Hippel detail how a norm of shunning 
copiers who fail to properly credit a recipe’s creator both protects novel 
recipes and enhances the reputations of the chefs that originated them, thus 
encouraging innovation without IP protection.7 Dotan Oliar and Christopher 
Sprigman’s work with stand-up comedians strikingly illustrates how social 
norms protect individuals’ jokes in the absence of IP by punishing violators 
 
 3 See infra Part I. By “social norms” we mean informal rules that emerge from and are enforced by 
nonhierarchically organized social forces. This definition of social norms emerges from the work of 
Robert Ellickson, which has been deeply influential in the IP studies we describe in this Article. ROBERT 
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 127 (1991). Social norms 
should be understood in the context of other forms of regulation of social life, or what Lawrence Lessig 
calls the “four types of constraint” on behavior: law, social norms, markets, and architecture. In contrast 
to social norms’ nonhierarchical enforcement, law constrains behavior through the “centralized 
enforcement of a state.” Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–64 
(1998). This Article concerns primarily the interaction between social norms and law, although some of 
our policy prescriptions involve regulation both through the market and architecture. 
 4 For recent summaries of IP’s negative-space literature, see Aaron Perzanowski & Kate Darling, 
Introduction, in CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 1 (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, 
When Are IP Rights Necessary?: Evidence from Innovation in IP’s Negative Space, in 1 RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THEORY (Peter Menell & Ben 
Depoorter eds., forthcoming 2018) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review) [hereinafter 
Raustiala & Sprigman, Rights]; Christopher Jon Sprigman, Conclusion: Some Positive Thoughts about 
IP’s Negative Space, in CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 249 (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017); see also the literature 
cited infra notes 26, 66, and 67. We take a capacious view of the term “IP’s negative space” to include 
both domains for which IP protection is currently unavailable and those in which creators choose to rely 
on social norms, despite the availability of IP protection. 
 5 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property 
in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1762 (2006) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy 
Paradox]. 
 6 Id. at 1722. 
 7 Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case 
of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 187 (2008). 
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with reputational sanctions, group boycotts, and sometimes even violence.8 
And in his study of tattoo artists’ communities, Aaron Perzanowski uncovers 
norms that punish the copying of only some types of tattoo designs (“custom 
designs”) but allow the copying of others (“flash designs” and other visual 
art from outside the tattoo community).9 Studies of other innovator 
communities have similarly shown how creativity and innovation can 
flourish without IP protection.10 
Because granting IP rights is a socially costly endeavor,11 and because 
social norms can be tailored to the needs of particular innovative 
communities more easily than IP rights, negative-space scholars tend to 
celebrate the ability of informal, low-cost social norms to promote 
innovation without incurring IP’s costs.12 While acknowledging that the 
social norms they describe can both over-reward and under-reward 
innovators, scholars writing in the negative IP space largely leave these 
 
 8 Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of 
Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1791 
(2008). 
 9 Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 515, 557–67 (2013). Such 
discrimination between custom and flash designs, Perzanowski argues, promotes innovation in the tattoo 
artists’ community by both preserving a robust market for custom tattoos and fostering creativity by 
sanctioning the free borrowing of preexisting designs from outside the community. Id. at 577–81. 
 10 See literature cited infra note 66. 
 11 IP rights generate deadweight loss, often require costly litigation for their enforcement, can create 
thickets of rights that hinder commercialization efforts, and represent a one-size-fits-all solution to what 
many analysts think is a problem that requires industry-specific interventions. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, 
Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328 (2015) (summarizing the vast literature that 
analyzes the efficiency of IP rights in fostering innovation). 
 12 See, e.g., David Fagundes, Talk Derby To Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing Roller 
Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1131, 1133 (2011) (arguing that nonlegal rules and norms 
“are preferable to formal law, in the context of nonmarket production by identity-constitutive 
communities” and emphasizing that “[p]revailing derby name norms also bring numerous efficiency 
advantages to their users”); William Hubbard, Inventing Norms, 44 CONN. L. REV. 369, 373 (2011) (“By 
overlooking social norms that promote invention and the effects of patents on these norms, the traditional 
view of patent law omits an important aspect of motivations to invent.” (footnote omitted)); Gerard N. 
Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry Norms, 2009 BYU L. REV. 875, 
890 (“[T]here is every reason to think that these customs (as in the curve ball example) actually encourage 
more sharing of knowledge and lower transaction costs in a way that makes the trade as a whole better 
off.”); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1833 (“Comedians’ social norms provide significant protection 
for creators’ incentives—protection that provides a baseline against which any contemplated introduction 
of enhanced formal protections should be assessed.”); Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 3 (“[T]he 
communities illustrated in this book demonstrate that creativity can thrive without legal incentives, and 
perhaps more strikingly, that some creative communities prefer self-regulation to law.”); Raustiala & 
Sprigman, Rights, supra note 4, at 7 (summarizing case studies in the negative IP space as “document[ing] 
the powerful role social norms play in stimulating innovation and constraining appropriation”); Sprigman, 
supra note 4, at 257 (arguing that IP’s negative space “turns out to be pretty positive from an economic 
point of view, at least in some industries” and emphasizing that, rather than stymie innovation, the lack 
of IP rights in the fashion industry “actually spurs [innovation]”). 
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negative effects unexplored.13 Put differently, IP scholars have not paid much 
attention to the ways in which social norms can reduce overall social welfare 
by hampering innovation, and the ways in which law can mitigate these 
harmful effects of social norms.14 
This Article fills that gap in the existing literature by exploring the dark 
side of social norms in innovator communities. Our work studying the 
sociology and psychology of innovation suggests that some social norms can 
mount substantial barriers to creative and innovative activities.15 We call 
these counterproductive social forces “anti-innovation norms.”16 Anti-
innovation norms can come in many forms.17 Here, we focus on a set of 
norms that are particularly harmful from an innovation perspective: those 
that interfere with boundary-crossing innovation (i.e., “boundary-
preserving” social norms).18 The sociology and psychology literatures 
converge on the insight that boundary-crossing work often yields some of 
 
 13 See infra notes 26, 66, 67 and accompanying text. 
 14 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 3, at 666 (contrasting Robert Ellickson’s “Old Chicago School” 
analysis of law and social norms—which emphasized how social norms made law irrelevant—with the 
“New Chicago School” approach—which sees social norms as an “object of law’s regulation”). 
 15 Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration: The Oncofertility 
Consortium as an Emerging Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 
259 (Katherine J. Strandburg, Brett M. Frischmann & Michael J. Madison eds., 2017) [hereinafter 
Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration]; Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and 
the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 813 [hereinafter, Pedraza-Fariña, Sociology of 
Innovation]; Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, The Social Origins of Innovation Failures, 70 SMU L. REV. 377 
(2017) [hereinafter, Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins]. 
 16 The term “anti-innovation norms” refers to instances in which social norms, on balance, retard 
innovation more than they foster it. The boundary-preserving social norms we examine in this Article 
function as anti-innovation norms when they become overenforced—what we suggest is a likely outcome 
absent policy interventions. 
 17 We suggest three broad categories of social norms with likely anti-innovation outcomes: (1) 
boundary-preserving norms, (2) gender norms, and (3) seniority norms. Given the importance of 
boundary crossing for breakthrough innovation, this Article will focus only on boundary-preserving 
norms and leave work on other types of norms in innovation communities for future research. For work 
on gender norms and innovation, see GENDER CODES: WHY WOMEN ARE LEAVING COMPUTING (Thomas 
Misa ed., 2010); Dan L. Burk, Diversity Levers, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 25 (2015); Dan L. Burk, 
Do Patents Have Gender?, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 881 (2011); Dan L. Burk, Feminism 
and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 183 (2007); Nathan 
Ensmenger, “Beards, Sandals, and Other Signs of Rugged Individualism”: Masculine Culture within the 
Computing Professions, 30 OSIRIS 38, 44 (2015) (showing how “many computer programmers embraced 
masculinity as a powerful resource for establishing their professional identity and authority”); Shelly 
Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 59 (1994). For 
work on status and seniority norms, see Ronald Fischer, Rewarding Seniority: Exploring Cultural and 
Organizational Predictors of Seniority Allocations, 148 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 167 (2008); Emmanuel Lazega 
et al., Norms, Status and the Dynamics of Advice Networks: A Case Study, 34 SOCIAL NETWORKS 323 
(2012). 
 18 Boundary-crossing innovation refers to the migration and recombination of ideas, methodologies, 
and ways of framing problems across communities of innovators that do not routinely interact with each 
other. 
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the most significant and socially beneficial advances.19 Yet social norms that 
prevent precisely this type of work from taking place feature in practically 
all creative communities. Current IP and social norms scholarship, by 
focusing almost exclusively on how social norms affect innovator behavior 
within community boundaries, misses how in-group social norms can 
hamper interactions across innovation communities. In other words, some 
social norms that solve local, community-specific collective action problems 
can also diminish overall social welfare by delaying boundary-crossing 
innovation.20 
This Article identifies and gives a full sociological and psychological 
account of three anti-innovation norms. Specifically, we explain how (1) 
research priority, (2) methodology, and (3) evaluation norms function in 
innovative communities in both technology and the arts to prevent or 
inefficiently delay important boundary-crossing innovation.21 Research 
priority norms dictate which problems innovative communities prioritize for 
study, methodology norms govern the methods used to study these problems, 
and evaluation norms shape how innovator communities evaluate the work 
of their members. These norms are initially established at the group level for 
rational reasons: they serve as efficient coordination mechanisms that benefit 
the group and its members. But due to individual-level psychological 
biases—in particular, status quo and confirmation biases—they tend to be 
overenforced, leading to anti-innovation inefficiencies.22 For example, 
overenforcement of research priority norms that privileged a focus on light 
and color, methodology norms that dictated working on unstretched, 
 
 19 See infra Section II.A. Both research within and across innovator community boundaries is 
important for social welfare. In fact, the two are interrelated: ideas and techniques cannot migrate and 
recombine from one community to another without each community having first developed deep 
knowledge specialization. But the type of research that crosses boundaries is particularly likely to be 
underproduced by the market. First, the gap between private and social value is likely larger in boundary-
crossing innovation because of the large social spillovers that accompany breakthroughs. Second, success 
in boundary-crossing innovation is often more uncertain, since it involves unfamiliar knowledge 
recombinations. Third, and the topic of this paper, because of the reputational effects of boundary-
preserving social norms, problems within a specialized community, and that community’s methodology 
for addressing them, will be preferred by group members (including marginal members) over 
intersectional problems or methodologies, even if both types of problems and methodologies (specialized 
and intersectional) have the same social value. 
 20 Some community norms (such as norms of attribution and anti-copying norms) that are enforced 
through shaming and reputational sanctions also run the risk of overenforcement through competition for 
status or esteem. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL Norms 92–93 (2000) (describing how 
punishments driven by reputational competition will often escalate beyond efficient deterrence levels); 
Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 342 
(1997) (describing how esteem competition can lead to overenforcement). 
 21 See infra Section II.B. 
 22 See infra Section I.B. 
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unprimed canvasses, and evaluation norms that limited a judgment of “good” 
to works that abided by these other norms in the 1940s Abstract 
Expressionist community left little room for alternative approaches and 
arguably delayed the emergence of Minimalism, Pop art, and other visual art 
forms.23 In the realm of science and technology, astronomers strongly 
enforced their intertwined research priority and methodology norms that 
privileged the visual exploration of the skies through optics technology. 
Community members who adhered to these norms flourished. In contrast, 
astronomers who became interested in using radio waves to explore the skies 
had difficulty publishing their research in recognized, peer-reviewed 
journals, securing federal and private funding, and obtaining university and 
industry employment. Yet, radio astronomy (many decades later) made it 
possible to discover the existence of cosmic microwave background 
radiation—providing evidence for the Big Bang theory of the universe.24 
Our Article makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, in 
contrast to the prevailing account in the innovation and norms literature, it 
focuses on how social norms can hamper innovation and identifies three of 
these anti-innovation norms. 
Second, it marries insights from the sociology and psychology 
literatures to give a complete theoretical account of these anti-innovation 
norms.25 Our account both engages with and expands on the broader law and 
social norms literature, which recognizes that social norms can be 
overenforced in welfare-reducing ways.26 More specifically, we show how 
the negative effects of research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms 
on boundary-crossing innovation can be explained both under existing 
signaling27 and esteem28 theories of social norms. Upholding a particular 
innovator community’s research priorities and methodology tools—and 
 
 23 See infra Section II.B. 
 24 See infra Section II.B. 
 25 See infra Sections III.B & III.C. 
 26 See infra Section III.C.2; see also, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL: THE LOGIC OF GROUP 
CONFLICT 72 (1997) (analyzing how certain group norms—“norms of exclusion”—can benefit group 
members at the expense of both other groups and society as a whole); POSNER, supra note 20, at 92 
(exploring the “pathologies of shaming,” which include excessive sanctions arising from the disconnect 
between private and social gains from shaming); Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 99, 112–13 (1989) (analyzing how some norms “embody solutions to local collective action 
problems” but “may work against the interest of society as a whole”); McAdams, supra note 20, at 342–
43 (developing an esteem theory of social norms that “identifies new situations in which norms reduce 
social welfare”). Robert Ellickson—the author who most directly influenced IP’s negative-space 
literature—while recognizing some negative features of social norms, is otherwise quite optimistic about 
them. See McAdams, supra note 20, at 409 (remarking that both Richard Ellickson and Richard Cooter 
“are fairly optimistic about norms”). 
 27 McAdams, supra note 20, at 342. 
 28 POSNER, supra note 20, at 58–61. 
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shaming those who do not—can serve as a signal to other community 
members of being a worthy, rigorous teammate. Under both signaling and 
esteem models, core, high-status members of an innovator community have 
a vested interest in enforcing norms on newcomers or marginal members to 
maintain their status as rigorous community members. Esteem or status 
competition, however, can ratchet up norm enforcement past its efficient 
level by making it very costly to challenge the prevailing social norm.29 Thus, 
what may start out as a mild preference for a particular research problem and 
methodology can escalate to strong, inflexible preferences—leading to too 
many individuals focusing on one particular problem with one particular 
methodology and neglecting other, equally important problems from a social 
welfare perspective. Our psychological analysis complements these two 
models by positing a psychological mechanism for these behaviors. 
Specifically, we propose that individual-level psychological biases—the 
status quo bias and the conformity bias in particular—lead group members 
to favor the existing research priorities and methodologies of the groups to 
which they belong, blinding them to other possibilities and ultimately 
leading to entrenchment and overenforcement of these norms. 
Third, this Article proffers an explanation for why the legal literature 
on innovation and social norms has to this point paid little attention to social 
norms’ potential anti-innovation effects. We posit that it is because most 
innovation scholars are focused on IP, and IP, in turn, is focused on 
addressing—primarily through the regulation of copying—the market 
failures that arise due to the public goods30 nature of innovation. Negative-
space scholars have thus turned their attention to social norms as an 
alternative device for solving the public goods (or free-rider) problem. But 
there are other important barriers to innovation besides the free-rider 
problem.31 In this Article, for example, the anti-innovation norms we identify 
have nothing to do with the public goods nature of innovation and 
 
 29 See id.; McAdams, supra note 20, at 366. 
 30 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW AND THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY xi (3d ed. 2016) (“Why group [copyright, patent, and trademark law] together 
then? The answer we will develop depends on a core similarity—the existence of a ‘good’—an invention, 
a creative work, a logo—that multiple people can use at once and that it is hard to exclude others from. 
(Economists refer to these as ‘public goods’ though they have more technical definitions of what those 
are.)”); William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical 
Perspectives, in 37 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION, AND THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, 
BELEIDSSTUDIES TECHNOLOGIE ECONOMIE (manuscript at 1) (2001), 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2UU-9DKS] [hereinafter 
Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation] (“We begin with some familiar generalizations: 
Technological innovations belong to the category of objects and services that economists refer to as 
‘public goods.’”). 
 31 See infra Section III.C.1 
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unauthorized copying of intellectual products. Instead, these three anti-
innovation norms function to prevent knowledge recombination across 
community boundaries and therefore channel the types of innovation 
produced by individuals and teams in suboptimal directions. 
This insight has implications for innovation scholarship that go far 
beyond the social norms literature. Specifically, if it is the goal of innovation 
scholars to maximize socially beneficial innovation, they must begin to 
reckon with other innovation dilemmas beyond the free-rider problem IP is 
designed to address. Our conclusions have much in common with the work 
of Brett Frischmann, Michael Madison, and Katherine Strandburg on 
knowledge commons.32 These authors have also called for an analysis of 
other social dilemmas in innovation.33 Our research complements their work 
in two ways: first, by emphasizing the importance of understanding how 
innovator communities interact (or fail to interact) with each other—not just 
with the public at large—and, second, by highlighting the importance of 
explicitly considering that boundary-preserving and other anti-innovation 
norms can result in negative externalities associated with “knowledge 
commons.”34 
The Article is largely descriptive and theoretical, but its insights pave 
the way for productive policy prescriptions. Specifically, the recognition that 
anti-innovation norms operate beyond the free-rider problem suggests that 
 
 32 See, e.g., GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & 
Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014) (offering a research framework to study knowledge commons, the 
institutionalized community governance of the sharing and creation of intellectual and cultural resources); 
id. (applying the authors’ framework for studying knowledge commons to case studies involving medical 
professionals and information); Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 665–66 (2011) 
(explaining the shortcomings of a functionalist account of IP and proposing a constructed-cultural-
commons framework to complement the functionalist approach). Yochai Benkler, in his pioneering work 
on commons-based production, has also analyzed how cooperation can emerge without formal (legal) 
coordination. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s 
Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002). In turn, these legal scholars 
draw inspiration from earlier work by Elinor Ostrom on natural resources commons. See, e.g., ELINOR 
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1990). But see Michael Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 103, 120 (2012) 
(describing how communities of innovation that share patents to facilitate innovation often require outside 
catalysts—such as government funding and infrastructure—to coordinate sharing). 
 33 Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg, Governing Knowledge 
Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1, 9 (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & 
Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014) (arguing that “a myopic focus on the free-rider issue may distract 
researchers and policy makers from other social dilemmas that may be more important in some contexts”). 
 34 Two questions that Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg include in their structured interview 
framework are “What are the degree and nature of openness with respect to each type of community 
member and the general public?” and “What costs and risks are associated with the commons, including 
any negative externalities?” Id. at 20–21. 
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IP law, which is designed primarily to address this problem, cannot fully 
correct the inefficiencies created by these norms. This prompts us to broaden 
our vision to consider other policy interventions beyond IP. 
Taking the first steps in this direction, we offer some concrete policy 
solutions that reach beyond the traditional IP-or-IP-substitute proposals and 
chart new territory, with recommendations for novel funding regimes and 
targeted tax credits for collaborative ventures. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I synthesizes IP’s negative-space 
literature and the conventional wisdom to which it has given rise—namely, 
that social norms in the innovation context are generally innovation 
promoting. We then place work on IP and social norms within the larger 
context of law and social norms scholarship. Part II challenges this 
conventional wisdom. Drawing from our work studying the sociology and 
psychology of innovation, we identify three anti-innovation norms and 
describe how they work to stifle creativity by hindering boundary-crossing 
innovation in both science and technology and the arts. This Part shows how 
these three anti-innovation norms—research priority, methodology, and 
evaluation norms—originally arise to solve coordination problems but, over 
time, are overenforced as a result of psychological biases. Part III examines 
the implications of anti-innovation norms for innovation policy and theory. 
We posit that innovation scholarship has focused too narrowly on solving 
the free-rider problem via IP or IP substitutes (like social norms). Because 
anti-innovation norms operate beyond the free-rider problem, unique policy 
solutions are required to adequately address them. Although changes to 
specific IP doctrines, such as attribution rights in copyright and 
nonobviousness in patent law, can help ameliorate the effects of anti-
innovation norms, policy solutions beyond IP are needed to comprehensively 
tackle their anti-innovation effects. We conclude by proposing some 
preliminary policy interventions along these lines. 
I. SOCIAL NORMS AND INNOVATION 
In the past two decades, legal scholars have rediscovered the power of 
social norms to influence behavior.35 In areas as disparate as contracts and 
 
 35 Robert Ellickson’s seminal work Order without Law, which demonstrated the prevalence of 
informal norms—and the irrelevance of legal rules—for achieving cooperative outcomes in close-knit 
communities, has served as the starting point for much of the work in this area. ELLICKSON, supra note 
3; see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. 
REV. 55 (1963) (describing the emergence of informal contract norms among close-knit communities of 
businessmen in Wisconsin, and laying the foundation for much of the work on relational contracts). 
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commercial law,36 criminal law,37 torts,38 family law,39 and tax law,40 scholars 
have uncovered the crucial role of social norms in regulating social behavior. 
Emphasizing the centrality of social norms, and the irrelevance of legal rules, 
these studies sparked a challenge of the prevailing “legal centralist” view of 
human behavior, a view that placed “governments [as] the chief sources of 
rules and enforcement efforts.”41 
IP, however, was thought to be an exception to this pattern. While other 
legal fields shifted their focus to understanding the interaction between law 
and social norms, IP scholars remained focused on the importance of 
governmental intervention to foster and maintain creativity and innovation.42 
This traditional assumption is now being challenged. IP scholars have 
recently identified myriad spaces where innovation proceeds apace without 
IP protection.43 The finding that social norms can play a key role in 
 
 36 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (analyzing the interplay between law and 
social norms in merchant communities); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and 
Economic Analysis, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (1997). 
 37 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for 
Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999); Dan M. Kahan, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996). 
 38 See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1 (1999). 
 39 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT 256 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of 
Marriage, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra at 201.  
 40 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1781 (2000). 
 41 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 4, 138; POSNER, supra note 20, at 4 (criticizing normative 
and positive branches of law and economics for assuming that individuals “are unaffected by the attitudes 
of others”—that is, by neglecting to consider that individuals often conform to social norms); Janice 
Nadler, Expressive Law, Social Norms, and Social Groups, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 60, 61 (2017) (“In 
contrast to the instrumental view that law operates on autonomous individuals by providing a set of 
incentives, the social groups view holds that a person’s attitude and behavior regarding any number of 
demands of law . . . is a product of the interaction of law, social influence, and motivational goals that are 
shaped by that person’s commitments to specific in-groups.”). 
 42 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 32, at 666 (“Intellectual property law 
scholarship has typically viewed invention, creative expression, innovation, and related or subsidiary 
activities (such as research and development) as a special set of practices for which extra encouragement 
is warranted.”); Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS: CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS  131–32 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 
2000) (charting the history of economic thinking on IP that reinforced the importance of governmental 
intervention to generate optimal levels of innovation). Studies on the role of social norms and innovation 
have lagged behind studies in other legal areas by at least a decade. See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman, 
Rights, supra note 4, at 2 (noting, in 2016, that the literature on social norms and innovation is “barely 
more than a decade old”). 
 43 A recent collection of essays is illustrative of the range of industries where social norms are now 
thought to foster innovation without IP or other governmental interventions. Perzanowski & Darling, 
supra note 4 (containing essays that describe the centrality of social norms for innovation in cuisine, 
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innovation processes is singularly important because it illustrates the reach 
of social norms in an area where predictions of the centrality of governmental 
intervention were thought to be most robust.44 In this part, we briefly describe 
both work on IP and social norms and on the field of law and social norms 
more broadly—emphasizing points of departure between the IP and social 
norms literature and the broader literature on law and social norms. 
Before we briefly summarize this literature, a note on what we mean by 
“social norms” is in order. We adopt the classification put forth by Robert 
Ellickson,45 whose work has served as a springboard for much of the work 
on innovation without IP that we discuss here.46 Social norms are rules that 
emerge from and are enforced by nonhierarchically organized social forces 
(as opposed to organizations or governments, which promulgate 
organizational rules and law, respectively).47 Much like organizational rules 
or law, social norms influence behavior in three ways: (1) by rewarding good 
(prosocial) behavior, (2) by ignoring ordinary behavior, and (3) by punishing 
bad (antisocial) behavior.48 Rewards and punishments are not hierarchically 
imposed; rather, they operate through an informal system of “vicarious self-
help,” which includes gossip, shunning, reputational harms or benefits, and 
may include violence in cases of egregious norm-breaking behavior.49 Thus, 
identifying the content of social norms that operate in particular communities 
requires recognizing the behaviors that such community labels as “good,” 
“ordinary,” or “bad,” as well as the carrots and sticks that such communities 
have developed to foster the good and dissuade the bad. 
With these definitions in mind, we now turn to the literature on social 
norms and innovation. 
A. IP Law and Social Norms 
The traditional justification for IP rights is utilitarian. IP is necessary to 
incentivize the efficient production of information goods. Absent IP 
 
medical devices and procedures, tattoo, roller derby, architecture, porn, and Nollywood (i.e., Nigerian) 
films); see also infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 44 See Menell, supra note 42, for a summary of the theoretical underpinnings of IP—focusing on the 
need for governmental intervention to avert market failure. 
 45 ELLICKSON, supra note 3. 
 46 See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1133 (“Ellickson’s Order Without Law is the cornerstone 
non-legal centralist explanation for the evolution of extralegal norm systems as forms of governance.”); 
Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7, at 187; Raustiala & Sprigman, Rights, supra note 4, at 5 (“At a 
foundational level this line of scholarship draws deeply from the well of ideas associated with Robert 
Ellickson (1991) and his influential book, Order Without Law.”). 
 47 ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 127. 
 48 Id. at 124. 
 49 Id. at 131. 
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protection, free riding by copyists would sharply limit financial returns to 
creators, ultimately diminishing incentives to create information goods in the 
first place.50 Despite the importance of this canonical story in shaping IP law 
and policy, the empirical evidence that IP law functions in the world as this 
traditional narrative predicts is, at best, inconclusive.51 In the past decade, a 
growing body of work has emerged that points to the irrelevance of IP 
protection for intellectual production, at least in a subset of creative fields. 
These studies argue that social norms can create overlooked incentives to 
innovate.52 Implicit in several of these studies—and as an explicit concern in 
others—is the suggestion that social norms represent a superior coordinating 
mechanism that provides tailored incentives to particular innovator 
communities without the attendant deadweight loss, holdup concerns, and 
high litigation costs that plague IP regimes.53 
Case studies have found social norms play a key role in fostering and 
maintaining creative output in a variety of fields including fashion, high-end 
cuisine, stand-up comedy, tattoo, roller derby, open-source software, flu 
vaccine research, and medicine, among others.54 Some of these communities, 
 
 50 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11 
(3d ed. 2003) (“Information has the characteristics of what economists call a ‘public good’—it may be 
‘consumed’ by many people without depletion, and it is difficult to identify those who will not pay and 
prevent them from using the information.”); Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation, supra note 30; 
William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 
OF PROPERTY 168, 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) [hereinafter Fisher, Theories of Intellectual 
Property] (“The distinctive characteristics of most intellectual products . . . are that they are easily 
replicated and that enjoyment of them by one person does not prevent enjoyment of them by other 
persons.”); Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 
631–32 (2012) (explaining how ideas are public goods: they are “copyable goods” that are “nonrivalrous” 
and “nonexcludable”); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2004) (explaining that according to the traditional theory, in the absence 
of IP protection people would prefer to copy others’ ideas rather than coming up with their own). 
 51 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 11, at 1335 (“[W]e have gone out, collected the evidence, and found 
that it is far from clear that IP is doing the world more good than harm.”). 
 52 See, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1832 (“None of the foundational theoretical studies 
(as distinguished from recent studies in IP law that focus on particular creative communities) 
meaningfully acknowledges the possibility that social norms can provide incentives to create.”); 
Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 2 (arguing that IP law has “historically disregarded non-legal 
regulatory tools that enable more granular, and potentially more effective, management of creative 
incentives”); Raustiala & Sprigman, Rights, supra note 4, at 7 (“Many negative space studies have 
documented the powerful role social norms play in stimulating innovation and constraining 
appropriation.”). 
 53 See infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
 54 See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW 
IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012); ROBERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, PUBLISHING, 
AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (2013) (foreign literary works); Fagundes, supra note 12 (roller derby names); 
Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7 (French cuisine); Blake Fry, Why Typefaces Proliferate Without 
Copyright Protection, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 425, 432–37 (2010) (typefaces); Hubbard, supra 
note 12; Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians’ Intellectual Property Without Law, in 
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such as the fashion industry and high-end cuisine, operate in an environment 
where IP protection is unavailable.55 In other industries, such as stand-up 
comedy, tattoo, and roller derby, IP protection is available but seldom used.56 
In yet other industries, such as open-source software, flu vaccine research, 
and medicine, participants actively discourage resort to IP law—despite it 
being readily available—often through contractual devices.57 
We identify two key takeaways from this literature. The first is that 
creativity can and does routinely take place not through IP law but through 
social norms. For example, in their study of stand-up comedians, Oliar and 
Sprigman conceive of social norms as averting the risk of market failures in 
the absence of IP rights.58 Similarly, Fauchart and von Hippel characterize 
norm-based IP systems as “enabl[ing] innovators to establish and enforce 
rights to some types of IP to their economic advantage.”59 And Perzanowski 
and Darling characterize current research on innovation without IP as 
revealing “the role that social norms, marketplace strategy, and architectural 
changes can play in shaping an environment hospitable to creativity.”60 In 
high-IP contexts, the social norms of openness and collaboration are also 
innovation inducing. For example, Katherine Strandburg describes several 
mechanisms by which the social norm of sharing in science-based industries 
 
LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010) (magic tricks); Fiona 
Murray et al., Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of Openness on Innovation, 8 AM. ECON. J.: 
ECON. POL. 212 (2016) (academic science); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8; Perzanowski, supra note 9; 
Raustiala & Sprigman, Rights, supra note 4; Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What 
Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
651, 653, 676–77 (2006) (jambands); Cathay Y. N. Smith, Street Art: An Analysis Under U.S. Intellectual 
Property Law and Intellectual Property’s Negative Space Theory, 24 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. L. 259 (2014) (graffiti); Robert Spoo, Courtesy Paratexts: Informal Publishing Norms and the 
Copyright Vacuum in Nineteenth-Century America, 69 STAN. L. REV. 637 (2017) (foreign literary works); 
Katherine J. Strandburg, Legal but Unacceptable: Pallin v. Singer and Physician Patenting Norms, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss 
& Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014). In her analysis of the flu vaccine network, Amy Kapczynski moves the 
debate beyond the IP or social norms dichotomy, to emphasize that innovation can flourish without IP 
but with other forms of governmental intervention. See Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual 
Property Law: Open Science in Influenza 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1539 (2017). Her emphasis on other 
government-based interventions to promote innovation is in alignment with many of the policy proposals 
we advance in Part III. 
 55 See, e.g., Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7, at 187; Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, 
supra note 5. 
 56 See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 12; Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8; Perzanowski, supra note 9. 
 57 See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 54; Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open 
Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197 (2002); Strandburg, supra note 54. 
 58 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1860 (“Our study suggests that even in instances where, at least 
initially, market failure seems likely, non-legal protections against unauthorized appropriation may later 
develop and avert the risk of market failure.”). 
 59 Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7, at 196–97. 
 60 Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 5 (emphasis added). 
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fosters innovation, including by “boost[ing] a user innovator’s reputation 
within the community and sometimes even among the broader public.”61 
Similarly, openness and collaboration, tied to “recognition” rewards, are 
postulated to enhance innovation in open-source software communities by 
incentivizing individual programmers to devote their time to open-source 
projects.62 
A second important lesson from the literature on social norms and 
innovation is that IP law does not function in a vacuum; rather, it functions 
against background social norms.63 The fact that formal law and informal 
norms coexist raises important questions about the impact of their interaction 
on innovation. Formal law could work synergistically with social norms, 
have no impact on the content of social norms, or undermine them.64 IP law 
and norms scholars have been cautious about predicting the direction of this 
interaction, although many have warned that IP law could diminish the 
innovation-enhancing effects of social norms—for example, by displacing 
cost-efficient, reputation-based norms with costly IP-rights regimes.65 
Two advantages of social norms systems over IP law feature 
prominently in most writings. First, social norms—unlike one-size-fits-all IP 
regimes—can be tailored to the needs of particular innovator communities.66 
 
 61 Katherine J. Strandburg, Derogatory to Professional Character?: The Evolution of Physician Anti-
Patenting Norms, in CREATIVITY WITHOUT LAW: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 63, 64 (Kate Darling & Aaron Perzanowski eds., 2017). Strandburg describes two additional 
reasons why a “sharing norm” is innovation enhancing. First, “user innovators benefit from a sharing 
norm because they can use the inventions shared by other community members. Second, by sharing their 
inventions with the community, user innovators obtain feedback and suggestions for improvement.” Id. 
at 63–64. 
 62 See, e.g., Lerner & Tirole, supra note 57, at 206. 
 63 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1866 (“The case for intellectual property law . . . must explain 
why non-legal regulation is inadequate, and why market failure is therefore likely in the absence of formal 
legal regulation.”). 
 64 See, e.g., id. at 1832 (“If a non-IP incentive is present either generally or in a particular market or 
creative practice, the marginal benefit of legal protection would thus be only the added creativity that 
formal law induces above and beyond that preexisting baseline of incentives.”). 
 65 See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1146 (“[T]here is something concerning about the increasing 
likelihood that the foundation of our blackletter IP law is premised on an empirical fact about motivation 
that does not match the way much (even if not all) modern creative production actually happens.”); Oliar 
& Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1836 (“If enforcement of property rights among stand-up comedians shifted 
toward the use of formal law (perhaps following changes in the copyright laws intended to encourage the 
use of formal law by comedians), the costs of monitoring and enforcement might be much greater, and 
could even displace the cost-effective informal enforcement customs that have developed over decades.”); 
Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1744–45 (“[I]t is also likely true that a move to 
a nominal high-IP regime in the United States is more likely to result in significant litigation compared 
to the same move in Europe.”); Strandburg, supra note 61, at 64 (“Patents may be both costly and 
dangerous to the viability of a user innovator community with a reputation-based sharing norm.”). 
 66 See, e.g., Horace E. Anderson, Jr., No Bitin’ Allowed: A Hip-Hop Copying Paradigm for All of Us, 
20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 115, 117 (2011) (arguing that informal norms in the hip-hop community are 
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Social norms carry with them the promise of adaptive flexibility while law 
imposes significant uniformity costs.67 Indeed, the social norms that emerge 
from studies in IP’s negative space are strikingly heterogeneous. In some 
cases, such as the fashion industry, social norms treat copying as “ordinary 
behavior” that is neither punished nor encouraged;68 in other cases, such as 
high-end cuisine, social norms punish only exact copying and 
misattribution.69 And yet in other cases, such as stand-up comedy, social 
norms mimic and even expand prohibitions against copying present in 
existing IP regimes.70 Finally, in open-sharing regimes, such as open-source 
software and flu vaccine research, social norms actively encourage 
information exchange.71 Second, enforcement costs in social norms regimes 
are often significantly lower than in legal regimes. Litigation costs and 
lengthy times to reaching a final verdict make legal enforcement in fact 
inaccessible to many innovators.72 
Although scholars recognize that the social norms at work in those 
communities could have harmful effects on society at large, they leave these 
negative effects largely unexplored. For example, Oliar and Sprigman briefly 
consider the possibility that comedians’ social norms may have a “net 
 
preferable to formal IP protection because community-tailored copying can distinguish “copying that 
promotes ‘progress’ from copying that inhibits it”); Fagundes, supra note 12, at 1136 (“[T]he informal 
manner in which derby girls enforce their name regulation rules creates a variety of flexible outcomes, in 
contrast with the binary approach of formal law, which tends to require all-or-nothing, winner–loser 
outcomes.”); Magliocca, supra note 12, at 877 (“[T]here should be a presumption against considering a 
process patentable subject matter . . . when a norm can be found in the relevant industry against patenting 
the class of innovation at issue.”); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1794 (“We emphasize that one 
attractive feature of social norms is that they offer a way to order creative practices that do not fit well 
within copyright law’s one-size-fits-all regime.”); Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 2 (“IP law 
displays a troubling insensitivity to the specific needs of particular creative communities, and it has 
historically disregarded non-legal regulatory tools that enable more granular, and potentially more 
effective, management of creative incentives.”); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative 
Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317, 346 (2011) [hereinafter Rosenblatt, IP’s Negative Space] (arguing 
that in certain fields, “internal norms that differ from traditional IP” are “better suited to serving the 
priorities of creators”); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Fear and Loathing: Shame, Shaming, and Intellectual 
Property, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 41 (2013) [hereinafter Rosenblatt, Fear and Loathing] (“In negative-
space communities, a lack of formal protection seems to benefit creation and innovation, at least partly 
because participants in these communities are governed by customized rule sets enforced by conscience 
and shame.”). 
 67 See, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1839 (“[N]orms-based IP systems may be desirable 
as a way of tailoring otherwise uniform IP rules.”). 
 68 Raustiala & Sprigman, Rights, supra note 4. 
 69 Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7. 
 70 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8. 
 71 Lerner & Tirole, supra note 57; Kapczynski, supra note 54. 
 72 See, e.g., Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 7, at 197. 
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negative social welfare effect.”73 Perzanowski and Darling also note that 
social norms may not produce an optimal balance of incentives and costs.74 
And Elizabeth Rosenblatt recognizes that shaming and reputational 
sanctions can be deeply damaging because they can “occur[] without regard 
for due process or proportionality.”75 Theirs and other writings in the IP and 
social norms scholarship largely sidestep this issue, however, often 
emphasizing that because it is uncertain whether current levels of copyright 
or patent protection are efficient, it is equally difficult to ascertain social 
norms’ levels of efficiency.76 But in the realm of IP law, determining the 
optimal length and scope of IP entitlements is an area of active empirical and 
theoretical investigation.77 Theoretically, as Amy Kapczynski has pointed 
 
 73 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1863; id. at 1836 (noting that “like formal IP law, norms-based 
regulation of jokes may err either by underprotecting or overprotecting creators”). 
 74 Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 7 (“We cannot prove, nor do we claim, that communities 
that rely on social norms or market-based responses to address information appropriation produce an 
optimal balance of incentives and costs.”). 
 75 Rosenblatt, Fear and Loathing, supra note 66, at 39; see also Rosenblatt, IP’s Negative Space, 
supra note 66, at 340 (noting that the very existence of social norms does not necessarily mean reliance 
primarily on social norms would be the best way to promote innovation in a given field). 
 76 See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 12, at 404 (recognizing the important conflicts between the 
traditional market-allocation justification for IP rights and reputation-based norm enforcement but 
concluding that “[a]ddressing these conflicts is challenging because of the difficulty of measuring the 
comparative costs and benefits related to inventing norms vis-à-vis those related to exclusive rights”); 
Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1839 (“We lack the baseline to make a reliable determination because 
we do not know whether formal copyright law is itself under- or over-protective with respect to any 
particular creative product at issue here.”); Perzanowski & Darling, supra note 4, at 7 (“[I]n part, the 
answer eludes us because IP policy has paid insufficient attention to isolating and measuring the 
incentives at the core of the justification for the IP system.”). There are some important exceptions to this 
lack of focus on the potential negative impact of social norms. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss has questioned 
the ability of social norms to promote optimal levels of creativity, emphasizing the fragility of norm-
based systems and their dependence on homogeneous, tight-knit communities. Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property 
Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1458–62 (2010). Jennifer Rothman has more broadly questioned 
efforts to interpret IP doctrines by reference to local customs, arguing that industry-developed customary 
norms are likely to be suboptimal when compared with formal IP law. Jennifer E. Rothman, The 
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1906–07 (2007). And Amy 
Kapczynski has criticized IP and social norms scholarship for generally neglecting to consider whether 
individual communities’ social norms are efficient from a societal perspective. Kapczynski, supra note 
54, at 1546. 
 77 Articles and books analyzing how to design an efficient patent and copyright systems are too many 
to comprehensively list. For some examples of this literature, see SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION 
AND INCENTIVES (2004); Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent 
Reform, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (2002); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. 
Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y. 531 (2000); 
Joshua Lerner, The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis, 25 RAND J. ECON. 319 (1994); 
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
839 (1990); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991). 
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out in a related critique,78 IP law is often deemed efficient because it relies 
on market signals to channel investments.79 This reliance on market signals 
also provides a test for when IP law is likely to work poorly (for example, 
when ability to pay is an inadequate signal of social need, or when there is a 
wide disparity between private and social returns, or when distributive 
concerns are normatively important).80 The efficiency of social norms, which 
are often maintained by nonpecuniary rewards, cannot be tethered to the 
same market signal rationale. This lack of emphasis on the potential anti-
innovation effects of social norms is an important point of departure from 
the broader law and social norms literature, in which scholars have focused 
more extensively on identifying when social norms are likely to be 
inefficient from a societal perspective, and to which we turn in the next 
Section.81 
B. Law and Social Norms 
The broader literature on law and social norms is not quite as optimistic 
as the IP literature about the power of norms to efficiently regulate social 
behavior. Robert Ellickson and Robert Cooter recognized that norms that 
increase the welfare of group members could harm outsiders and thus be 
potentially detrimental to society at large.82 In Ellickson’s theory, social 
norms emerge and are maintained because they are welfare maximizing for 
the members of the group: whether to promote, ignore, or punish a particular 
behavior is the result of a “subtle calculus of cost minimization” through 
which community members “engage in more enforcement activity to 
encourage cooperative behavior only if they expected that the marginal gains 
from the additional cooperation would exceed the marginal costs of the 
additional enforcement.”83 Notice also that we speak here of “communities” 
 
 78 Kapczynski, supra note 54, at 1546–47 (arguing that “[t]he norms literature has largely ignored 
the question” of whether the types and quantity of innovation generated by social norms regimes is 
efficient from a societal perspective). 
 79 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 19–
20 (1969); see also Kapczynski, supra note 54, at 1557–58. 
 80 See, e.g., Kapczynski, supra note 54, at 1557–60 (analyzing the contexts in which the market 
allocation theory of patent law fails to produce efficient results). 
 81 See supra note 76. These other critiques, however, do not explore anti-innovation norms in depth, 
nor do they analyze the sociological and psychological mechanisms that maintain their anti-innovation 
effects. 
 82 See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 169 (“[N]orms that add to the welfare of the members of a certain 
group commonly impoverish, to a greater extent, outsiders to that group.”); Robert D. Cooter, 
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law 
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1690–94 (1996); Robert Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory, 
22 J.L. & SOC’Y. 50, 65–66 (1995); Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law 
Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 224 (1994). 
 83 ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 173. 
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as the locus where social norms emerge. The vast majority of social norms 
are bounded: they are the product of particular communities linked together 
by geography, cultural identity, or other defining factors.84 They also 
generally apply only to community members.85 In fact, Ellickson limited his 
theory of social norms to “close-knit” communities86: those in which 
“informal power is broadly distributed among group members and the 
information pertinent to informal control circulates easily among them.”87 
Other theorists, however, have paid closer attention to social norms’ 
negative consequences for social welfare, including the social welfare of 
group members themselves. For example, Richard McAdams has argued that 
norms arise from and are maintained by individuals’ desire for the “esteem 
of others”—i.e., their good opinion or respect.88 In this theory, social norms 
can reduce social welfare in two situations. First, social norms are inefficient 
when they do not arise to solve collective action problems.89 Second, social 
norms can produce excessive (and thus inefficient) levels of conformity.90 In 
this second situation, what McAdams terms “esteem competition” results in 
norms that originally arise to solve a collective action problem being 
overenforced, so that people carry out inefficiently high levels of a particular 
activity.91 In McAdams’s model, norm overenforcement can take place 
because esteem is a relative good (i.e., we seek esteem in comparison to 
others), and because imposing esteem sanctions is relatively costless.92 
Competition to be “well thought of” compared to others raises the cost of 
noncompliance—i.e., the status loss from deviance—while simultaneously 
decreasing the gains from compliance.93 Norm competition thus incentivizes 
individuals to seek “high – or ‘hero’ – status by leading the way to new and 
 
 84 Of course, organizational rules and law are also bounded in that they apply to members of a 
particular institution, or—depending on the type of law— a particular state or country. 
 85 But see ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 141 n.15 (“[N]orms (or perhaps self-enforced personal ethics) 
can influence the interactions of parties who are not members of a close-knit group”). 
 86 ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 177 (“The hypothesis predicts that welfare-maximizing norms emerge 
in close-knit settings but is agnostic about whether such norms can emerge in other social settings.”). 
 87 Id. at 177–78. 
 88 McAdams, supra note 20, at 342. 
 89 Id. at 412. 
 90 Id. at 419. 
 91 Id. at 371 n.123. When law and social norms scholars analyze whether a norm is “efficient” they 
refer to either Pareto-efficiency or to the Kaldor-Hicks criteria for efficiency. Under the former, a norm 
is efficient because it makes some or all members of the group better off and nobody worse off. Under 
the latter, a social norm is efficient if those who benefit from the norm could—through their gains from 
the new social norm—fully compensate those who do not (although no actual compensation need take 
place). See id. at 409 n.235 (describing these two criteria as applied to law and social norms scholarship). 
When we characterize a norm as “overenforced,” we use the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria. 
 92 Id. at 355–57. 
 93 Id. at 365–66. 
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higher levels of norm compliance.”94 There is no necessary relationship, 
however, between the optimal level of compliance with the norm (from a 
societal perspective) and the norm equilibrium achieved through esteem 
competition.95 
Eric Posner develops a game-theoretic signaling theory of social norms 
in which social norms function as costly signals to others that one is a 
desirable cooperative partner, or a “good type.”96 Because any costly action 
can be a signal (including behaviors that could be welfare reducing for 
society at large), the private good obtained from sending a costly signal 
(enhancement of reputation) is unrelated to whatever public good (or bad) 
that might be produced as a consequence of the behavior used as a signal 
(i.e., the resulting social norm).97 Social norms often impose a choice on good 
types with “idiosyncratic tastes and values” who will either suppress these 
tastes—to signal their good type—or satisfy them and be shunned.98 
Russell Hardin takes a more pessimistic approach to social norms in 
relationship with overall social welfare.99 Focusing on the role of social 
norms on ethnic conflict, Hardin identifies two types of social norms: norms 
of “exclusion” and “universalistic” norms.100 The former are norms that 
“reinforce individual identification with the group and enhance the 
separation of the group from the larger society or from another specific group 
in the society.”101 The latter apply uniformly (or “universalistically”) to all 
members of a society.102 Hardin argues that norms of exclusion are beneficial 
to most individual group members and are driven by self-interest, but can be 
very socially harmful.103 Norms of exclusion “work by changing the interests 
of marginal [or fringe] group members to get them to act in conformity with 
 
 94 Id. at 366. “The result is that one individual’s decision to refrain from engaging in X has the 
externality of raising the price that others must then pay for engaging in that behavior.” Id. at 367. 
 95 Id. at 420 n.273. 
 96 POSNER, supra note 20. 
 97 Id. at 24–25. While in McAdams’s model, sanctions (withholding esteem) are considered 
relatively costless, in Posner’s model, signals are always costly. In addition to costly actions, signals can 
include shunning others with idiosyncratic tastes or behaviors. Shunning is costly because it “cuts off 
opportunities for cooperative gains and risks retaliation.” Id. at 25. 
 98 Id. at 27–28, 214. 
 99 HARDIN, supra note 26. Cf. Elster, supra note 26, at 100 (identifying situations in which a norm 
may benefit the group but harm society as a whole, as well as situations in which a social norm does not 
benefit anyone). 
 100  HARDIN, supra note 26, at 72 (Hardin defines these two types of norms as “those that redound to 
the benefit of members of a more or less well-defined subgroup within a larger society, and those that 
seem to apply universalistically to more or less all members of a society.”). 
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 72–73. 
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the interests of the core of the group.”104 Why would fringe individuals adopt 
the “core” norms or values of the group? Hardin gives us two reasons. First, 
assuming that there is often a conflict of interest over limited resources 
between groups, norms of exclusion allow coordination for access to limited 
resources (such as state subsidies) for group members only.105 Second, norms 
of exclusion serve an “epistemological” purpose: they preserve the “benefits 
of comfort, familiarity, and easy communication in one’s group.”106 Here, 
group preservation is a consumption good itself.107 Importantly, as in 
Posner’s model, Hardin’s social norms are ultimately maintained because 
they function as a signal (in Hardin’s model, to signal group identity).108 The 
negative impact of norms of exclusion arises from their effect on both fringe 
members and those ultimately excluded. Thus, maintaining the comforts of 
familiarity “typically require[s] exclusion of those who make for 
discomfort—often hateful exclusion.”109 And the economic benefit of access 
to jobs and position requires exclusion of others on the basis of 
nonmembership.110 
Applying these theories to previous case studies on IP’s negative space 
allows us to identify situations in which social norms are likely welfare 
reducing and which merit closer study. For example, stand-up comedians’ 
norms that punish copying of even the very general premise for a joke and 
that do not allow for independent invention could plausibly be the result of 
inefficient norm overenforcement through esteem competition.111 When one 
can obtain the esteem of peers by claiming to be an “honest” and “original” 
comedian who never steals, esteem competition can make behavior that is 
considered dishonest more and more extreme over time.112 And the behavior 
of tattoo artists, whose norms sanction the free copying of art made by 
 
 104 Id. at 72. 
 105 Id. at 76–77 (“In a conflict in what is roughly a constant-sum game, at least for the short run, 
some subgroup or coalition can benefit its members most quickly by excluding others from access to the 
limited resources.”). 
 106 Id. at 77 (emphasis removed). When norms of exclusion serve an epistemological purpose, their 
enforcement is often costless. As Hardin explains, “[t]hey are not sanctioning per se; rather, they are 
merely acting in the interests of their comfort in familiarity or whatever and excluding those who are 
unfamiliar.” Id. at 90. 
 107 Id. at 77. 
 108 Id. at 82 (“Once the convention is in place, I can most readily show my identity by following it. 
The norm of using it becomes functional to identification with the group.”). 
 109 Id. at 217. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 8, at 1823 (“Along these same lines, we heard from many of our 
interviewees that appropriation of even very general comedic premises—anything that, even if at a high 
level of generality, was not ‘stock’ or ‘commonplace’—was objectionable.”). 
 112 Id. (“Perhaps less so than any other creative form we can think of, comedians have little esteem 
for even the most expert reworkings of others’ ideas.”). 
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“outsiders” but not of original tattoos, while potentially a signal to 
differentiate good from bad types within the tattoo community, may be a 
behavior that diminishes overall social welfare once we take into account its 
effect on those outsider artists whose work tattoo artists freely copy.113 
Our goal in this Article is to widen current conceptualizations of social 
norms in innovation to include both pro- and anti-innovation features of 
these norms. The three types of norms we describe in the next Part of this 
Article—research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms—while 
serving an important coordinating and focusing function, also maintain 
boundaries of particular innovator communities and prevent the productive 
recombination of knowledge across them. Because knowledge 
recombination across communities of innovators is crucial for breakthrough 
innovation, these norms can result in important social costs. Anti-innovation 
norms are reinforced by psychological processes that favor the status quo 
and in-group conformity. We describe these processes in Part II, providing 
the first scholarly synthesis in IP law of how psychological biases serve to 
create and maintain sociological norms. Describing anti-innovation norms 
opens the door for potential policy interventions to lessen their anti-
innovation effects. These interventions can include, but are not limited to, 
changes in IP law itself. 
II. ANTI-INNOVATION NORMS 
In this Part, we describe three types of social norms that are at work in 
innovator communities: (1) research priority, (2) methodology, and (3) 
evaluation norms. An important function of these three types of norms is to 
erect and maintain boundaries between different innovator communities. In 
turn, these boundaries prevent or inefficiently delay important boundary-
crossing innovation. 
Because an important role of these three norms is to establish difference 
between communities of innovators, they could be characterized as norms of 
“exclusion” in Hardin’s terminology. Nevertheless, as we explain in more 
detail below, the effect of these norms on innovation is more complex. First, 
by erecting boundaries between communities these norms serve at least one 
positive social function: they increase specialized knowledge, allowing for 
coordinated research on specific topics and faster accumulation of and access 
to specialized knowledge. This welfare-enhancing effect differs from 
Hardin’s norms of exclusion whose sole function is to increase benefits to 
insiders by establishing difference and limiting opportunities to outsiders. 
 
 113 Perzanowski, supra note 9, at 564–67. 
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But these types of norms have two crucial anti-innovation features. 
First, sometimes they simply function to establish difference without 
attendant social benefits. For example, they can give rise to specialized terms 
that substitute for standard terminology for the sole purpose of differentiating 
its users from those who do not use the special terminology.114 Second, these 
norms run the constant risk of being excessively enforced. Excessive 
enforcement of community boundaries leads to excessive specialization and 
insufficient communication across boundaries. We show how excessive 
enforcement takes place through subtle psychological biases (the status quo 
bias and the conformity bias) that reinforce the boundary-preserving function 
of these norms. 
In our analysis below, we begin with a short synopsis of how 
psychological and sociological accounts of innovation converge to show the 
importance of boundary-crossing recombination for creativity. We then 
describe in detail how research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms 
function as anti-innovation norms by preventing such productive knowledge 
recombination in a variety of creative industries. Our narrative combines 
sociological and psychological insights. These two lenses provide both 
macro and micro accounts of how social norms shape individual behavior. 
In so doing, we expand upon the current theories of social norms in the legal 
literature. Our account outlines a psychological mechanism through which 
inefficient norms become internalized—and thus become unexamined, 
implicit routines in innovator communities. 
We conclude by offering some remarks on the theoretical implications 
of anti-innovation norms. We link our discussion to broader debates in the 
law and social norms literature—something the existing IP and social norms 
literature has not sufficiently done—showing how our analysis of the 
psychological bases of anti-innovation norms complements prevailing 
models of norm development. 
A. The Psychology and Sociology of Creativity and Innovation 
Both psychology and sociology have long been interested in how 
individuals and organizations access and recombine existing knowledge to 
create new knowledge. We and others have written about this literature in 
 
 114 See HARDIN, supra note 26, at 79–80 (Hardin made this point about the development of slang in 
some ethnic communities, noting that “some community-specific slang may . . . do no more than 
substitute for standard terminology. Its effective function is, rather, to distinguish its users as users, to 
signal their difference from those who do not use the special terminology.”); see also Dan L. Burk & 
Jessica Reyman, Patents as Genre: A Prospectus, 26 LAW & LITERATURE 163, 164 (2014) (using genre 
theory methodology to argue that the patent document itself—including its use of jargon—can be in part 
understood as serving the social role of shaping and preserving the boundaries of the “patent 
community”). 
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previous work, and we provide only a short synopsis here.115 This rich and 
varied scholarship converges on a singular insight: creativity (or 
innovativeness) is enhanced through the recombination of knowledge from 
distant domains.116 By distant domains, we mean simply knowledge from 
specialized fields that are not routinely brought together. 
Studies from network and organizational sociology have shown that 
firms that are located in a “structural hole” in a knowledge network produce 
more “innovative” products and have better ideas than their competitors.117 
Structural holes are discontinuities in social relationships.118 If we imagine 
communities of innovators as nodes in a knowledge network, information 
developed within communities whose members interact routinely with each 
other will flow quite readily among those community members (who are 
connected by strong social ties) but will have a tendency to remain trapped 
inside community boundaries. Therefore, firms that occupy structural 
holes—or “brokers”—are in an enviable position: they have unique access 
to knowledge from two (or more) communities that do not routinely interact 
with each other.119 More recent sociological studies have further refined the 
concept of a knowledge broker. Shifting the focus from a single organization 
(or individual) to that of a team, recent network studies show that innovations 
that are considered most creative by peers arise from teams with overlapping 
memberships in distant knowledge domains.120 In other words, team 
creativity requires both trust (from people who have previously worked 
together, hence the need for overlap) and knowledge distance.121 Trust is 
thought to be essential for distant communities to overcome the tensions that 
arise when separate bodies of knowledge and different ways of 
 
 115 See, e.g., Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Innovation Inc., 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713 (2017); 
Stephanie Plamondon Bair, The Psychology of Patent Protection, 48 CONN. L. REV. 297 (2015) 
[hereinafter Bair, Psychology]; Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1441 (2010); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and 
the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2011); Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing 
Interdisciplinary Collaboration, supra note 15; Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins, supra note 15; Pedraza-
Fariña, Sociology of Innovation, supra note 15. 
 116 By creativity or innovativeness, we mean a particular type of innovation that has a high social 
value (and that people do in fact value). 
 117 See, e.g., Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes and Good Ideas, 110 AM. J. SOC. 349, 349–50, 353 
(2004). 
 118 Id. at 353. 
 119 Id. at 353–55. 
 120 See, e.g., DAVID STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE: ACCOUNTS OF WORTH IN ECONOMIC LIFE 
(2009); Mathijs de Vaan, David Stark & Balázs Vedres, Game Changer: The Topology of Creativity, 
120 AM. J. SOC. 1144 (2015); Balázs Vedres & David Stark, Structural Folds: Generative Disruption in 
Overlapping Groups, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1150 (2010). 
 121 de Vaan, Stark & Vedres, supra note 120, at 1154–55. 
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understanding the world come into contact.122 Trust enables ongoing 
communication between distant communities across structural holes. 
Richard Lester and Michael Piore have called this process of ongoing 
communication across structural holes an “interpretation” process.123 In 
contrast to analytical problem-solving, which is goal driven and bounded by 
a particular problem to be solved, interpretation requires the “capacity to 
integrate across organizational, intellectual, and cultural boundaries”124 and 
the capacity to “move forward in the face of uncertainty.”125 In most new 
technologies and new art forms, analytical problem-solving comes after a 
period of open-ended discussion and “play” with the possibilities arising 
from potential combinations across existing community boundaries.126 
Many of the most innovative contributions to society have been fueled 
by this interpretive process across community boundaries. From the 
discovery of the structure of DNA127 to the discovery of Big Bang radiation128 
in the basic sciences; from the rise of designer jeans129 to new music and art 
forms such as jazz, tango, and Pop art in the arts;130 and from cell phone 
technology131 to new diagnostic technologies132 in applied science—
transformational advances in the arts and sciences tend to originate with 
innovators working in areas outside their original fields of training or with 
teams that combine expertise from distant domains.133 
 
 122 Id. at 1153. 
 123 RICHARD K. LESTER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INNOVATION—THE MISSING DIMENSION 53 (2004). 
 124 Id. at 5. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 54. 
 127 See, e.g., HORACE FREELAND JUDSON, THE EIGHTH DAY OF CREATION: MAKERS OF THE 
REVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY (1979) (describing how the discovery of the double-helical structure of DNA 
was enabled by the migration of physicists to biology). 
 128 See, e.g., Charles H. Townes, Resistance to Change and New Ideas in Physics: A Personal 
Perspective, in PREMATURITY IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY: ON RESISTANCE AND NEGLECT 46, 46–47  
(Ernest B. Hook ed., 2002) (describing how the application of radio engineering techniques to astronomy 
led to the discovery of background radiation that provided evidence for the Big Bang theory). 
 129 LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 20 (explaining how this type of innovation involved 
“crossing the boundaries that separated manufacturing . . . from the previously distinct industries of 
textiles, laundering and finishing, and washing machines”). 
 130 DIANA CRANE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AVANT-GARDE: THE NEW YORK ART WORLD, 
1940–1985, at 22 (1987). 
 131 LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 15–17 (explaining how the development of cell phone 
technology was enabled by the combination of two-way radio and telephone engineering). 
 132 Id. at 21–23 (explaining how medical devices draw on both basic life sciences and clinical 
practice). 
 133 LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 21–23 (explaining how medical devices draw on both basic 
life sciences and clinical practice); DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, ORIGINS OF GENIUS: DARWINIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON CREATIVITY 125 (1999); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 
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Psychological studies have also demonstrated how boundary-crossing 
collaborations contribute to creativity and innovation.134 For example, as 
Gregory Mandel has summarized in previous work, empirical work in 
psychology shows that subjects exposed to dissimilar images tend to produce 
more creative works (as judged by independent observers) than subjects who 
do not receive this exposure.135 
Innovators who cross boundaries are also judged as being more creative 
by their peers. Scientists who have training or other experience outside of 
their own narrow disciplines are more likely to be singled out by their 
colleagues as creative.136 And those with the best reputations and highest 
productivity are better able to call on a diversity of sources in their work.137 
The cognitive basis for these results is the psychological concept of 
“associative richness.”138 Associative richness refers to the ability of creative 
people to draw unusual associations among seemingly unrelated concepts.139 
For example, when asked to name a word related to “table,” a less creative 
respondent might answer “chair.” A more creative respondent (evincing 
greater associative richness) might respond instead with “elbow.”140 The idea 
underlying the correlation of boundary-crossing collaboration with greater 
creativity is that those engaged in these collaborations have a natural 
exposure to a wider array of seemingly unrelated ideas and therefore greater 
opportunities to express associative richness in their thinking.141 
Despite its importance, the process of “interpretation” as Lester and 
Piore put it, is “not widely understood or even fully recognized” in both 
scholarly literature on innovation policy and actual managerial practice.142 
We agree with Lester and Piore. In the next section, we show how the neglect 
of the interpretive process in the legal academy stems from (1) the failure to 
recognize the existence and importance of anti-innovation norms that 
prevent conversations across community boundaries and (2) an overfocus on 
 
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1190 (2007); R. Keith Sawyer, Creativity, Innovation, and Obviousness, 
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 461, 480–81 (2008). 
 134 See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 115, at 2013–16. 
 135 Id. at 2014 (citing SIMONTON, supra note 133, at 46). 
 136 Id. (citing TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 87 (1996)). 
 137 Id. (citing Sarnoff A. Mednick, The Associative Basis of the Creative Process, 69 PSYCHOL. REV. 
220, 223 (1962)). 
 138 Id. at 2015. 
 139 Liane Gabora, Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying the Creative Process, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CREATIVITY AND COGNITION 126, 128 (T. Hewett & T. 
Kavanaugh eds., 2002). 
 140 Id. 
 141 See Mandel, supra note 115, at 2015. 
 142 LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 8–9. 
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addressing the free-rider and appropriability problems through innovation 
policy.143 
Despite the social benefits generated by knowledge recombination 
across boundaries of inventor communities, specialized communities of 
innovators develop social norms to preserve their boundaries. As we argue 
below, these norms emerge initially out of rational self-interest, as they 
function as coordination devices that benefit the group and its members. 
Psychological processes embed these norms into community routines, 
however, ultimately leading to their socially inefficient overenforcement. 
Overenforcement of boundary-preserving social norms privileges narrow 
analytical problem-solving inside community boundaries over open-ended 
interpretation across them. 
B. Three Types of Anti-Innovation Norms: Research Priority, 
Methodology, and Evaluation Norms 
1. Research Priority Norms 
An important feature that distinguishes one community of innovators 
or artists from another is which problems they prioritize for focus and study. 
Research priority norms in different communities thus separate legitimate 
from illegitimate research questions within that community. Identifying and 
framing important problems worthy of scientific or artistic exploration is, 
perhaps surprisingly, often more difficult than finding a solution to those 
problems. As Charles Darwin is said to have remarked looking back on his 
development of the theory of evolution: “I think it was more difficult to see 
what the problems were than to solve them, so far as I have succeeded in 
doing, and this seems to me rather curious.”144 For this reason, research 
priority norms can serve an important focusing and coordinating function. 
By specifying particular problems as especially worthy of study, research 
priority norms guide community members to work together at solving them. 
In turn, having multiple people focus on a solution for a particular problem 
speeds up its resolution and provides deeper insights. This is the bright side 
of research priority norms. 
For example, in the basic sciences, astronomers’ research priority has 
long been the observation of increasingly distant objects.145 This research 
priority led to an intense focus in this community on the development of 
 
 143 See also Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins, supra note 15, at 430–35 (discussing how patent law 
undervalues the importance of problem-finding—often an “interpretive” undertaking—in innovation). 
 144 ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL RESEARCH AND THE PRACTICING PROFESSIONS 17–18 (Aaron 
Rosenblatt & Thomas F. Gieryn eds., 1982). 
 145 See, e.g., Townes, supra note 128, at 46–47. 
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better and more sophisticated optical telescopes.146 Similarly, in the 
biological sciences, oncologists and cancer biologists have long been 
interested in understanding the mechanisms that control cell division.147 Such 
focus in cancer biology has led to a deeper understanding of how particular 
genetic mutations that deregulate proliferation give rise to cancer.148 In the 
telephone equipment industry, increasing voice quality and preventing 
dropped calls was long a research priority.149 The majority of research in the 
telephone industry was therefore focused on improving the “switch” 
technology responsible for signal quality.150 Finally, in the art industry, 
different communities of artists developed their own, distinct aesthetic 
traditions.151 Each tradition prioritized different aesthetic problems and 
techniques in its art.152 Take, for example, the two distinct groups within 
Abstract Expressionism—the color-field painters and the gesture painters: 
whereas the color-field painters prioritized the visual impact of light and 
color, the gesture painters favored subjective, individualistic expression of 
emotion.153 Much like the other innovator communities described in this 
 
 146 Id. 
 147 See, e.g., Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration, supra note 15, at 265–
67. 
 148 See, e.g., Douglas Hanahan & Robert A. Weinberg, The Hallmarks of Cancer, 100 CELL 57, 57 
(2000) (“The barriers to development of cancer are embodied in a teleology: cancer cells have defects in 
regulatory circuits that govern normal cell proliferation and homeostasis.”); Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, 
Mechanisms of Oncogenic Cooperation in Cancer Initiation and Metastasis, 79 YALE J. BIOLOGY & 
MED. 95, 100 (2006) (“Understanding the mechanisms of oncogenic stimulation of proliferation and 
death is important to dissect specific cancer-initiation pathways and to develop therapeutics.”). 
 149 See, e.g., LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 15–17. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See, e.g., CRANE, supra note 130, at 22 (“The fact that [art] styles generate a long-term 
commitment on the part of some artists is an indication that each style reflects a distinctive ‘worldview’ 
composed of attitudes toward past and contemporary artistic achievements, appropriate subject matter, 
and the acceptability of various techniques.”). It may seem odd to characterize expressive works as 
addressing a particular “research priority” of their respective artistic communities. Yet, different 
communities of artists do indeed have “preoccupations” or “priorities” that are examined through their 
chosen means of expression. For example, the confrontation between Abstract Expressionists and Pop 
artists had much to do with their differing preoccupations or research priorities. Abstract Expressionists 
saw themselves as engaged in a struggle for individualistic self-expression in an often hostile, man-made 
world. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEJA, REFRAMING ABSTRACT EXPRESSIONISM 3 (1993) (arguing that Abstract 
Expressionist art had an “investment in the psyche of modern man, that it held forms and gestures to be 
revelatory,” and “that it was somehow responsive to the terrors of the man-made world”); TILMAN 
OSTERWOLD, POP ART 8 (2003) (characterizing Abstract Expressionism as focused on “subjectivism 
and . . . self-realization”). In contrast, Pop artists were preoccupied with analyzing the intersection of life 
and art, questioning the Abstract Expressionists’ subjectivist detachment from every-day life and objects, 
and bringing together “high-brow” and “low-brow” topics. See, e.g., id. at 8 (Pop artists “responded to 
the painting of subjective, psychosomatic mood with objective reflections of contingent reality which 
they saw as symbols of life as it was lived.”). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 23. 
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paragraph, the distinct research priorities of each group allowed the 
emergence of a shared dialogue over the proper way to approach a canvas.154 
But research priority norms have an important dark side that impedes 
innovation. By emphasizing which research problems are worth studying 
they exclude other problems from analysis. Of course, the problems that are 
excluded by one community’s research norms may be emphasized in a 
different community. The key exclusionary effect of research priority norms, 
however, is felt when solving a problem falls at the intersection of two or 
more communities, or simply outside any community’s research priorities. 
When this is the case, research priority norms in effect deprioritize 
intersectional problems. But as research from the sociology and psychology 
of innovation shows, solving intersectional problems frequently generates as 
large, and often greater, social benefits than those prioritized by each 
innovator community. In other words, research priority norms act as anti-
innovation norms when they are strongly enforced within a community, so 
that members—and in particular marginal members—are discouraged from 
focusing on intersectional problems. Note, however, that our argument does 
not require that intersectional problems (or problems that require expertise 
from more than a single community to be formulated and solved) be more 
socially valuable than problems located within community boundaries. 
Rather, we argue that—even assuming intersectional and internal problems 
have the same social value—research priority norms will lead to an 
overfocus on the latter and underfocus on the former type of problem. The 
key to understanding this effect is to recognize that research priority, 
methodology, and evaluation norms will inefficiently push fringe or 
marginal innovators (who reside at the boundaries of their community) to 
focus on “core” community problems, using “core” community 
methodologies. This is precisely what happened in the creative communities 
of astronomers, oncologists, telephone engineers, and Abstract 
Expressionists described above. 
The existence of social norms is best demonstrated through episodes of 
enforcement: it is when transgressors are punished for deviating from 
accepted research priorities that the underlying norm often becomes visible. 
Take, for example, astronomers’ focus on optics technology and on the 
visual exploration of the skies. The enforcement of the norm of visual 
exploration took place through reputational sanctions and shunning 
astronomers who became interested in using radio waves to explore the skies. 
The deviant astronomers had difficulty publishing their research in 
 
 154 Id. at 62 (“The Abstract Expressionists redefined artistic conventions concerning the appropriate 
way to approach the canvas. They did not begin with a subject, the subject emerged from their work on 
the canvas.”). 
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recognized, peer-reviewed journals, securing federal and private funding, 
and obtaining university and industry employment.155 In contrast, 
astronomers who followed priority norms were rewarded with reputational 
and career-advancement benefits.156 In hindsight, however, the norm-
breaking astronomers’ were onto something: the discovery of Big Bang 
radiation was made possible not by mainstream astronomers but by a radio 
engineer at Bell Laboratories who had serendipitously trained his radio 
antenna onto the skies.157 
For their part, oncologists’ focus on cell division led to the development 
of powerful chemotherapeutic drugs for cancer. These drugs, however, can 
have very detrimental effects on fertility.158 Research on the impact of 
chemotherapeutic drugs on fertility, however, fell at the intersection of two 
communities: oncologists and endocrinologists. While oncologists 
privileged understanding dysregulated cell division, endocrinologists 
privileged understanding infertility in otherwise healthy women. The 
intersectional problem of “chemotherapeutic-driven infertility” was 
addressed by neither group.159 And efforts to address it were met with 
important reputational and financial hurdles: neither the oncology nor the 
endocrinology communities were willing to provide financial backing for 
such projects.160 At the same time, research projects that fell squarely within 
the research priorities of the respective oncology and endocrinology 
communities were routinely rewarded with grant awards and job-promotion 
opportunities.161 
The ubiquitous cell phones that few of us could do without emerged at 
the intersection of communities of telephone and radio engineers. One key 
obstacle to the development of cell phone technology was the clashing 
research priorities of these two communities. As Lester and Piore explain, 
while signal quality was an “obsession” with telephone engineers, “[r]adio 
engineers had a reputation in the industry as cowboys: their knowledge was 
 
 155 See, e.g., Townes, supra note 128, at 47–48 (describing how “big shot[s]” in astronomy strongly 
discouraged emerging astronomers’ interest in radio waves and recounting how a faculty member in 
Harvard’s astronomy department interested in radio astronomy was discouraged by the department from 
pursuing this line of work). 
 156 See id. 
 157 Jansky’s important discovery, however, remained underappreciated both by engineers and 
astronomers. In the words of an observer, “[n]either fish nor fowl, it was unable to be appreciated by 
either the scientists or engineers, and therefore lay untouched as an isolated curiosity.” Woodruff T. 
Sullivan, III, Karl Jansky and the Discovery of Extraterrestial Radio Waves, in THE EARLY YEARS OF 
RADIO ASTRONOMY 3, 3 (W. T. Sullivan, III ed., 1984). 
 158 Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration, supra note 15, at 261. 
 159 Id. at 261–62. 
 160 See id. at 265–67. 
 161 Id. at 267. 
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empirical, ad hoc, hands on. . . . Signal quality was often indifferent, fading 
in and out; communications were frequently interrupted and lost.”162 
Finally, the hegemony of Abstract Expressionist thinking in New York 
City in the 1940s made it almost impossible for artists interested in less 
abstract, more representational art to gain recognition. As Diana Crane 
explains: “[A]t the very time that Abstract Expressionism was perceived as 
exhausted and bankrupt, it simultaneously exerted a hegemony so absolute 
that it offered young artists no room to maneuver.”163 Alternative approaches 
to art, including Minimalism164 and Pop art,165 emerged in spite of such 
hegemony due to performance events that brought together dancers, painters, 
sculptors, musicians, and performing artists who developed a joint interest 
in “translat[ing] real-life activities into art.”166 In these performance events, 
research priority norms were relaxed and boundaries between communities 
became fluid. In contrast to much of the dominant art world where aesthetic 
ideologies and loyalties were narrowly drawn and mutually exclusive, 
performance events allowed “visual artists [to] mingle[] as freely with 
dancers and performing artists as with other painters and sculptors, with the 
result that aesthetic influences moved easily back and forth across 
disciplines.”167 
2. Methodology Norms 
Methodology norms (or how to study a problem) are as emblematic of 
a community of innovators’ essence as are the research problems such 
community chooses to address. In fact, under one interpretation of culture, 
culture is defined by the particular tools and routines a community uses for 
solving problems.168 Methodology norms are inextricably tied to research 
priority norms. Often, research problems are prioritized based on what a 
particular community’s methodology (or way of understanding the world) 
can in fact study. Sociologists of science have called these “do-able 
 
 162 LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 16–17. 
 163 CRANE, supra note 130, at 25. 
 164 Id. at 27. 
 165 Id. at 32. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 31. 
 168 See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Alexander, Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance Between Ritual and 
Strategy, 22 SOC. THEORY 527, 565–66 (2004); Paul DiMaggio, Culture and Cognition, 23 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 263, 264–65 (1997); Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 
273, 273 (1986) (defining culture as a “‘tool kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which 
people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems”). 
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problems,” that is, problems that can be solved with the tools that have been 
developed and privileged in a particular community.169 
For example, astronomers’ research priority norm of studying 
increasingly distant stellar objects was coupled with (and influenced by) a 
methodology norm of using optical telescopes as the right technology to 
study the skies.170 Similarly, the methodologies and painting techniques 
privileged by Abstract Expressionists—for example, allowing the 
composition to simply emerge from their spontaneous work on the canvas—
were linked to their research priorities that emphasized individual self-
expression and rejected representation of the outside world.171  
Much like research priority norms, methodology norms can serve a 
positive social function by focusing and coordinating research efforts. But 
they can also have a negative, anti-innovation side. When particular 
methodologies become emblematic of a community’s identity, endorsing a 
particular methodology often means excluding alternative, nonconforming 
methodologies. Thus, astronomers first rejected what would later be known 
as radio astronomy; telephone companies resisted using what they 
considered inferior and often unreliable radio communication technology 
and its more flexible, ad hoc trouble-shooting methods;172 and Abstract 
Expressionists rejected Pop artists’ inclusion of representational, everyday 
commercial objects and pictures in their work.173 
Because intersectional problems are often best addressed by a 
combination of methodologies, the kinds of exclusion described above can 
have important negative social consequences. For example, in astronomy, 
the combination of optical and radio telescopes has provided insights that 
neither one of these approaches could provide on their own. While optical 
astronomy is ideal for the detection of objects such as stars and galaxies that 
emit a lot of visible light, radio astronomy allowed the detection of new types 
of objects that are undetectable with optical telescopes, such as pulsars and 
quasars.174 These insights were delayed by initial resistance to radio 
astronomy techniques rooted in research priority and methodology norms of 
 
 169 Joan H. Fujimura, Constructing ‘Do-Able’ Problems in Cancer Research: Articulating 
Alignment, 17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 257, 257 (1987). 
 170 See, e.g., Townes, supra note 128, at 47. 
 171 See, e.g., CRANE, supra note 130, at 62. 
 172 LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 16. 
 173 CRANE, supra note 130, at 62 (“With Abstract Expressionism, the modernist aesthetic tradition 
became highly esoteric, excluding from its domain humanistic values, decoration, representation, and the 
rapidly expanding phenomenon of popular culture.”). 
 174 See, e.g., Rene P Breton & Tom Hassall, The Future for Radio Astronomy, 54 ASTRONOMY & 
GEOPHYSICS 6.36, 6.36–6.39 (2013). 
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the astronomy community.175 In the development of cell phone technology, 
the “deep-rooted” “cultural differences between radio and telephone 
engineering” erected significant hurdles to collaboration and, more 
specifically, to the modification of key telephone technology (the switch) for 
use in the complex wireless cellular architecture.176 Finally, in the art world, 
the cultural hegemony of Abstract Expressionism and its control over the arts 
economy posed important obstacles to young artists who resisted what they 
saw as Abstract Expressionists’ narcissistic tendencies and overfocus on art 
as a therapeutic tool.177 
There are two additional ways in which methodology norms can work 
as anti-innovation norms. First, methodology norms narrow the types of 
problems that a community will prioritize. While this narrowing can 
sometimes be efficient by serving a focusing and coordinating function, it is 
often inefficient. Prioritizing problems according to whether they can be 
solved using available methodology runs the risk of prioritizing unimportant 
problems (from a social welfare perspective) and deprioritizing problems 
whose solution requires a combination of methodological skills that no 
individual community alone possesses. The organizational sociology 
literature that attempts to explain patterns of institutional change has 
similarly emphasized the problem of methodology-bounded problems. As 
Neil Fligstein explains: actors’ interpretations of key organizational 
problems “will reflect their structural positions [i.e., group membership and 
training], and their solutions will reflect the interests of those structural 
positions.”178 It is not necessarily the most important organizational problems 
that are being solved. Rather, which problems are prioritized and how they 
are solved depends on actors’ methodological ability to solve them and their 
power to impose their solution.179 
Second, methodology norms can lead to the development of particular 
community-specific “slang” or ways to describe a particular problem that, 
over time, become inaccessible to outsiders.180 For this reason, many 
innovator communities travel on parallel paths, searching for solutions to the 
same problems but never realizing they are in fact working on the same 
problems because the different “slangs” used to describe these problems 
 
 175 Townes, supra note 128, at 47–48. 
 176 LESTER & PIORE, supra note 123, at 17. 
 177 LAUREN RABINOVITZ, POINTS OF RESISTANCE: WOMEN, POWER & POLITICS IN THE NEW YORK 
AVANT-GARDE CINEMA, 1943-71, at 108–09 (1991). 
 178 Neil Fligstein, The Spread of the Multidivisional Form Among Large Firms, 1919–1979, 50 AM. 
SOC. REV. 377, 388 (1985). 
 179 Id. at 388–89. 
 180 See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 26, at 79–80. 
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mask their similarities. A prominent example of this phenomenon arises in 
the area of mathematics, in which the solution to a fifty-year-old conjecture 
was finally achieved when a team of mathematicians and computer scientists 
realized that two problems faced by computer scientists (a “graph 
compression” problem) and one faced by mathematicians and physicists (a 
“quantum physics” problem) were in fact different framings of the same 
problem.181   
3. Evaluation Norms 
The final set of social norms that can impede innovation arise from how 
innovator communities evaluate the worth of the work of their members. 
Evaluation norms often serve to reinforce research priority and methodology 
norms. What is considered good work by core community members reflects 
the community’s research and methodological priorities and will create 
incentives for marginal group members to conform to those priorities in 
order to access the benefits of group membership. What types of evaluation 
norms a community will favor varies, but there are six common types of 
evaluation norms that are prevalent in innovator communities. Specifically, 
good work is often considered the type of work that is: (1) patented, (2) 
published in peer-reviewed journals, (3) published in specific peer-reviewed 
journals, (4) vetted by core members of particular innovator communities, 
(5) meets particular productivity standards, or (6) increases a company’s 
market share. Much like research priority and methodology norms, 
evaluation norms have a bright side: they reinforce a community’s good 
practices in terms of methodology, they channel community members’ 
efforts to specific research priorities, and, in some instances, they reduce 
search costs for “good” work. 
Following our discussion of research and methodology norms, the dark 
side of evaluation norms should come as no surprise: when overenforced, 
evaluation norms inefficiently maintain research priority and methodological 
blinders that prevent boundary-crossing innovations. Indeed, there is 
increasing awareness on the part of funding agencies that community-
specific evaluation norms can discourage transdisciplinary research, and a 
growing literature in innovation policy addressing how to develop better 
evaluation norms.182 Two examples can clarify this point. The first continues 
 
 181 See Nikhil Srivastava, The Solution of the Kadison-Singer Problem, YOUTUBE (May 31, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnRHuuMjKrQ [https://perma.cc/UD88-CKNB] (video tutorial); see 
also Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins, supra note 15 (describing in detail the solution of this fifty-year old 
mathematical problem, the Kadison-Singer problem). 
 182 See, e.g., Brian M. Belcher et al., Defining and Assessing Research Quality in a Transdisciplinary 
Context, 25 RES. EVALUATION 1, 14 (2016) (“The lack of a standard and broadly applicable framework 
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the story of efforts to investigate and treat infertility arising from cancer 
treatments. The proposals of an enterprising group of scholars who wanted 
to focus their research efforts on understanding the impact of 
chemotherapeutic drugs on fertility were rejected by multiple funding 
agencies. In the words of one of these researchers: 
[Our project] was very good, but then the grants would fall between the cracks 
because the portfolio for the NIH had no way to understand fertility in a cancer 
setting. . . . It fit neither under the NCI [(National Cancer Institute)] nor the 
NICHD [(National Institute for Child Health and Human Development)].183 
In other words, the protocols each one of these agencies used for 
evaluating which projects were worthy of funding reinforced the research 
priorities of each community represented in each institute (cancer and 
reproductive endocrinology, respectively). 
The second example concerns efforts to translate basic research 
findings into clinically relevant applications. Quite frequently, for basic 
science to translate into clinical applications or marketable interventions 
such as drugs or new methods of treatment, scientists must work closely with 
their clinical or industry counterparts.184 This type of collaboration, however, 
is often complicated by the different evaluation norms of the basic science, 
clinical science, and industry communities. While researchers who focus on 
basic science, typically housed at universities or research institutes, are 
evaluated on the basis of the number and quality of peer-reviewed 
publications featuring their research,185 their industry counterparts are often 
discouraged from publishing their results; rather, “good work” in an industry 
context is often reflected in the number of patents to an inventor’s name.186 
As a consequence, academia–industry collaborations require an adjustment 
of each community’s evaluation methods. For example, successful 
biotechnology companies were able to attract academic scientists by relaxing 
their secrecy requirements and allowing scientists to publish their findings 
in peer-reviewed journals (thus maintaining their status as good academic 
 
for the evaluation of quality in [transdisciplinary research, TDR] is perceived to cause an implicit or 
explicit devaluation of high-quality TDR or may prevent quality TDR from being done.”). 
 183 Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration, supra note 15, at 23. 
 184 See, e.g., Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and 
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1521–39 (2012). 
 185 See, e.g., Chris Tachibana, New Tools for Measuring Academic Performance, SCI. MAG. (Feb. 
10, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://www.sciencemag.org/features/2017/02/new-tools-measuring-academic-
performance [https://perma.cc/D38Z-MPP9]. 
 186 Mark G. Brown & Raynold A. Svenson, Measuring R&D Productivity, 31 RES. TECH. MGMT. 
11, 11 (1998) (“Typical outputs [of an R&D lab] include patents, new products, new processes, 
publications, or simply facts, principles, or knowledge that were unknown before.”). 
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scientists).187 Conversely, in academic science, patents are increasingly being 
used as a signal of productivity.188 Leaving aside worthy objections against 
the propertization of academic science, this realignment of evaluation norms 
to create a form of evaluation hybrid has been credited with the success of 
biotechnology firms in Silicon Valley and Boston.189 
4. Conclusion 
This section summarized how (1) research priority, (2) methodology, 
and (3) evaluation norms can have anti-innovation effects through their 
overenforcement. How, then, do these norms emerge, and how are they 
maintained in the first place? What leads to their overenforcement? The next 
section provides a psychological account of anti-innovation norm 
emergence. In so doing, we couple the macrolevel descriptions of innovator 
behavior provided by social norms research with microlevel explanations 
rooted in psychology. 
C. The Psychological Underpinnings of Anti-Innovation Norms 
How do particular social norms emerge in innovative communities, and 
why do they persist even when they have anti-innovation effects? The 
explanation lies partly in individual-level psychological biases. We posit that 
an understanding of two biases in particular—the status quo bias and the 
conformity bias—does much to explain the persistence of the anti-innovation 
norms we discuss here. Though the biases, like the norms themselves, can 
serve beneficial functions, they can also lead to entrenchment and 
overenforcement of social norms that ultimately stymie innovation-
enhancing, boundary-crossing collaborations. 
 
 187 See, e.g., Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your (Trade) Secrets: Knowledge Networks as 
Innovation Drivers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1578 (2017) [hereinafter Pedraza-Fariña, Trade 
Secrets]. 
 188 See, e.g., Paul R. Sanberg et al., Changing the Academic Culture: Valuing Patents and 
Commercialization Toward Tenure and Career Advancement, 111 PNAS 6542, 6543 (2014). 
 189 Pedraza-Fariña, Trade Secrets, supra note 187, at 1577–79. 
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1. Psychological Biases Generally 
Psychologists have long been aware that people are subject to bias in 
their decisionmaking.190 These cognitive biases can impair judgment and lead 
to suboptimal choices in a range of situations.191 
During the lead-up to and aftermath of the 2016 presidential election, 
for example, there was much talk in the media of confirmation bias: the 
tendency for people to seek out and selectively remember information that 
confirms their existing beliefs.192 Instead of basing political decisions on 
rational thought, this propensity leads people to process information in ways 
that are highly driven by emotional considerations.193 Commentators pointed 
to the role the bias may have played in exacerbating the divide among voters 
of different political stripes.194 Facebook—its algorithms designed to show 
users stories it thinks they want to see based on their prior account 
activities—was particularly targeted as an enabler and aggravator of 
 
 190 See, e.g., Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the 
Human Brain, 313 SCI. 684, 684 (2006) (noting humans’ “systematic biases in choice behavior”). Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky are widely credited with empirically elucidating the details of humans’ 
biased decisionmaking, based on earlier suggestions by the economist Herbert Simon. For examples of 
their foundational work, see, for example, Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment 
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329–36 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265–73 (1979); 
Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive 
Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49 (Thomas Gilovich 
et al. eds., 2002); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208‒09 (1973). For examples of Simon’s work, see, for 
example, Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99–100 (1955); 
Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 495 
(1979). 
 191 Katherine L. Milkman et al., How Can Decision Making Be Improved?, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 379, 379 (2009) (describing how biases can lead to costly errors in decisionmaking, like 
“undersav[ing] for retirement, engag[ing] in needless conflict, marry[ing] the wrong partners, accept[ing] 
the wrong jobs, and wrongly invad[ing] countries”). But see William S. Cooper, Decision Theory as a 
Branch of Evolutionary Theory: A Biological Derivation of the Savage Axioms, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 395, 
395 (1987) (arguing that cognitive biases may have an evolutionary basis such that “behavior previously 
thought to be irrational might turn out to be biologically rational”); Martie G. Haselton & David C. 
Funder, The Evolution of Accuracy and Bias in Social Judgment, in EVOLUTION AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 15, 16–17 (Mark Schaller et al. eds., 2006) (same). 
 192 See Michael Shermer, The Political Brain, SCI. AM. (Jul. 1, 2006), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-political-brain [https://perma.cc/XJ9D-LDDF] 
(describing research elucidating the neural underpinnings of confirmation bias in politics). 
 193 See id. (describing an experiment wherein subjects had their brains scanned while evaluating 
statements made by Republican and Democratic presidential candidates—while parts of the brain 
associated with logical reasoning were dormant during this task, areas associated with emotional 
processing and reward were extremely active). 
 194 See, e.g., Scott Bixby, ‘The End of Trump’: How Facebook Deepens Millennials’ Confirmation 
Bias, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/oct/01/millennials-facebook-politics-bias-social-media [https://perma.cc/QX3P-7TED]. 
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confirmation bias.195 As an illustration, the Wall Street Journal constructed 
“red” and “blue” Facebook feeds, the side-by-side comparison emphasizing, 
in a striking way, how different the world looks from conservative and liberal 
perspectives.196 
The potential harms arising from confirmation bias in the political 
sphere are many, including, on the individual level, a narrow and unrealistic 
worldview,197 and on the societal level, a decreased capability for “shared 
values and common discourse.”198 Scholars have written about the damage 
confirmation bias can wreak in other areas as well, including scientific 
research199 and criminal investigations.200 
Confirmation bias is just a single example of how people systematically 
depart from rational thinking. Psychologists have empirically identified 
myriad other ways in which bias creeps into our decisionmaking.201 
Our focus here is on how cognitive biases can lead to anti-innovation 
norms. Specifically, the status quo bias and the conformity bias help explain 
why research priorities, methodologies, and evaluation norms become 
entrenched in ways detrimental to innovation. 
2. Status Quo Bias 
a. The bias 
The status quo bias describes the empirically identified tendency for 
decisionmakers to prefer the current state of things over change, even when 
 
 195 See, e.g., Selena Larson, Facebook Shows You What You Want to See Post-Election, CNN MONEY 
(Nov. 9, 2016, 9:39 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/09/technology/filter-bubbles-facebook-
election/index.html [https://perma.cc/4NPE-TL2V]; Bixby, supra note 194. 
 196 Blue Feed, Red Feed: See Liberal Facebook and Conservative Facebook, Side by Side, WALL 
STREET. J., http://graphics.wsj.com/blue-feed-red-feed [https://perma.cc/2J6X-LXK3]. 
 197 Michelle Tang, I Know You Are and So Am I: The Dangers of Confirmation Bias, HUFFINGTON 
POST (published Oct. 6, 2016, 2:13 PM; updated Dec. 6, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelle-
tang/i-know-you-are-and-so-am-_b_12375786.html [https://perma.cc/FUD6-WW2L]. 
 198 Ken Stern, Maybe the Right-Wing Media Isn’t Crazy, After All, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 3, 2016, 5:00 
AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/11/the-right-wing-media-isnt-crazy 
[https://perma.cc/H2CB-4PXD]. 
 199 See, e.g., Daniele Fanelli, Do Pressures to Publish Increase Scientists’ Bias? An Empirical 
Support from US States Data, PLOS ONE (Apr. 21, 2010), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0010271 [https://perma.cc/6B3U-3ZGE] (describing how 
scientists’ confirmation bias is exacerbated when there is high publication pressure). 
 200 See, e.g., Carole Hill et al., The Role of Confirmation Bias in Suspect Interviews: A Systematic 
Evaluation, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 357, 365 (2008) (describing how expectations of 
guilt lead to “self-fulfilling prophecy”-type suspect interviews); Saul M. Kassin et al., The Forensic 
Confirmation Bias: Problems, Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & 
COGNITION 42, 45 (2013) (describing how the confirmation bias can corrupt lay witness memories and 
forensic scientific results). 
 201 See, e.g., COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, 
JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY (Rüdiger F. Pohl ed., 2004) (describing a number of these biases). 
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change would enhance utility.202 A person might prefer to stick with her 
existing health plan, for example, though switching would result in 
substantial economic and nonpecuniary benefits.203 
There are a number of reasons why humans have this bias—some of 
which serve completely rational ends. One of these ends is reducing 
transition costs associated with a change, which might outweigh the benefits 
of the switch.204 Relatedly, there might be advance uncertainty about the 
utility to be gained from a change in any particular direction that makes the 
move costly relative to the status quo.205 
Apart from these rational reasons for favoring the status quo, there are 
irrational psychological factors that may also contribute to the preference. 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky famously demonstrated that people are 
loss averse: when making decisions they give more weight to potential losses 
than to potential gains of equal magnitude, and they weigh costs and benefits 
relative to their individual starting point.206 A person contemplating a change 
from the status quo may thus choose not to act even when the potential gains 
outweigh the potential losses because she weighs the losses more heavily in 
her analysis.207 
Related to loss aversion is the phenomenon of regret avoidance.208 
People try to avoid situations where it might appear, after the fact, that they 
have made a wrong choice, even when the choice was in fact correct in light 
of the then-available information.209 Indeed, as Kahneman and Tversky have 
shown, people feel more regret when a loss in utility is the result of a new 
action rather than an adherence to the status quo.210 
Regret avoidance is influenced by, and helps entrench, existing social 
norms. William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser offer the example of a 
parent deciding whether to bring his infant along on a fifteen-minute trip to 
 
 202 William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988) (describing experiments revealing a status quo bias). 
 203 See id. at 26–31 (describing the results of an experiment in which subjects preferred to stay with 
an existing hypothetical health plan despite demonstrated preferences for other options). 
 204 Id. at 33–34. 
 205 Id. at 34. 
 206 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 
342 (1984). 
 207 Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 202, at 35–36. Interestingly, Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
demonstrate experimentally that the status quo bias persists even in the absence of loss aversion. Thus, 
though the status quo bias is consistent with loss aversion, it is not completely explained by it. 
 208 Id. at 38. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preference, 246 SCI. AM. 160, 160 
(1982). 
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the grocery store.211 Although the risks to the infant of driving in the car are 
higher than those of being left alone for a short time, the parent’s choice is 
framed by regret avoidance, which in turn is framed by social norms. If 
something happened to the infant while home alone, the parent, according to 
prevailing social norms, would likely be perceived as having made the 
“wrong” choice and would accordingly feel greater guilt and regret. This 
interaction of social norms with regret avoidance will likely prompt the 
parent to bring his baby along, though it is the objectively more dangerous 
course of action.212 As more parents, driven by regret avoidance, make this 
choice, the norm becomes further entrenched. 
The concept of sunk costs is also a relevant factor here. A completely 
rational actor would understand that previously incurred costs should not 
determine future actions.213 But after large personal or financial investments, 
real people may feel reluctant to cut their losses and may instead be tempted 
to “throw good money after bad” in an attempt to redeem or justify their 
initial course of action.214 This tendency too is driven in part by social 
considerations. A person might be reluctant to admit to others, through a 
change of course, that the original plan was a failure.215 
A final reason for the status quo bias is the phenomenon of cognitive 
dissonance avoidance—a desire to maintain a consistency of thought and 
avoid conflicting ideas and beliefs.216 Because people like to think of 
themselves as competent decisionmakers, they rationalize past decisions 
(including bad ones) to conform to this belief.217 This colors future 
decisionmaking as well.218 If someone has rationalized to herself that a past 
mistake was in fact a good decision in order to avoid cognitive dissonance, 
she may believe that a corrective or alternative course of action is 
unnecessary.219 
b. How the status quo bias leads to anti-innovation norms 
We explained previously that research priority, methodology, and 
evaluation norms can become entrenched and overenforced in innovative 
 
 211 Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 202, at 38. 
 212 Id. 
 213 E.g., Vernon L. Smith, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, 99 J. 
POL. ECON. 877, 890 (1991) (“According to the usual interpretation of economic theory, the optimizing 
firm or individual should ignore sunk costs in weighing gains and losses at the margin . . . .”). 
 214 Id. at 890–91; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 202, at 37. 
 215 Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 202, at 37; Smith, supra note 213, at 890–91. 
 216 Id. at 38–39. 
 217 Id. at 39. 
 218 Id. 
 219 See id. 
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communities, leading to suboptimal innovation. Though these norms serve 
legitimate purposes, it is community members’ unwillingness to depart from 
them even when doing so would be socially beneficial that is troubling. The 
status quo bias helps explain this reluctance. 
Take, for instance, research priorities. In a world of scarce time and 
resources, each innovative community must prioritize particular types of 
projects over others. Thus, astronomers focused on optics, oncologists 
prioritized cell division, the telephone industry drilled down on voice quality, 
and Abstract Expressionists emphasized subjective, individualistic 
expression. But why did these priorities become so entrenched in their 
respective communities that group members ignored, and were sometimes 
even overtly hostile to, other possibilities? A simple, partial explanation is 
that group members were all biased toward maintaining the status quo. 
The mechanisms underlying the status quo bias help us understand why. 
Consider transition costs. Adopting new research priorities, or even 
collaborating with those whose priorities are different from yours, entails 
significant transition costs. These costs may include, but are not limited to, 
the efforts required to define new priorities, reconcile disparate practice 
styles, and learn the unique language and terminology that tends to evolve in 
particular communities.220 For instance, an oncologist trained in cell division 
has most likely spent most of her career learning the techniques and language 
of cell biology, and probably knows very little about the techniques and 
language of endocrinology. Investing the time and effort required to learn 
enough about endocrinology to enable a successful collaboration incurs 
opportunity costs that, when coupled with uncertain benefits,221 may seem 
prohibitive.222 The oncologist could simply spend that time and effort 
pursuing more familiar research questions with more predictable—though 
perhaps lower—payoffs. 
The psychological factors that contribute to a preference for the status 
quo also help explain research priority norms. Loss aversion will cause the 
risks one incurs by branching out in a new direction to loom larger than the 
prospective gains. This skewed cost–benefit analysis is exacerbated by the 
desire to avoid the enhanced regret that follows when failure results from a 
departure from accepted norms. Thus, the Abstract Expressionist who 
chooses to buck the status quo by pursuing more realist avenues will be 
judged more harshly by her peers and will feel more regret if the endeavor 
fails than if she had taken no such action.223 It is much safer from her 
 
 220 Pedraza-Fariña, Social Origins, supra note 15, at 417–22. 
 221 See id. 
 222 Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 202, at 26–31. 
 223 Cf. id. at 38 (arguing that regret avoidance is one cause of status quo bias). 
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perspective not to follow this course of action in the first place, even if 
creative gains are sacrificed.224 
These psychological factors may also be amplified in community 
settings. Loss aversion will wield a particularly strong influence when the 
potential losses are comparatively large and may affect multiple people 
beyond the actor.225 Likewise, regret avoidance, driven by social norms, may 
play an outsized role when the actor is being “watched” by various parties 
inside and outside the community, including colleagues, employees, 
competitors, stockholders, and commentators. The actor might thus prefer to 
maintain the status quo rather than move in a novel and innovative direction, 
even when the new course will likely result in creative and economic 
benefits. If failure occurs, the actor who maintained the accepted status 
quo—like the parent who brings his child on the short errand—will be judged 
less harshly by others and will experience less regret.226 
The sunk costs fallacy and a desire to avoid cognitive dissonance also 
likely contribute to the entrenchment and overenforcement of research 
priority norms. An actor who pursues an initial course of action may be 
particularly reluctant to change direction, not only out of an unwillingness to 
cut his losses, but also because a change might suggest to observers inside 
and outside his community that his initial efforts were misguided.227 
Cognitive dissonance avoidance will exacerbate this reluctance if a 
decisionmaker has internalized and rationalized his previous decisions.228 
The astronomer who has devoted his career to a visual exploration of the 
skies may thus be unwilling to try something new—radio waves, for 
example—even if his efforts are not yielding results, because doing so might 
be experienced as a painful admission to others—and himself—that his life’s 
work was a waste of time. 
Importantly, this line of thinking also gives the astronomer an incentive 
to prevent others from trying something new as well.229 To maintain the 
perception that his efforts were not misguided, it is necessary that those 
around him act in ways that support this view. Scaling up to the population 
 
 224 Samuelson and Zeckhauser offer up Copernicus as a real-life example of the harsh judgment that 
results when an innovator attempts to buck the status quo. Copernicus was deemed mad by his peers for 
suggesting that the earth revolved around the sun and not vice versa. Id. at 46–47. 
 225 See id. at 35–36. 
 226 Id. at 38 (discussing organizational decisionmaking and regret avoidance). 
 227 Id. at 37–38. 
 228 See id. at 38–39. 
 229 This is a case in which “other-regarding” preferences can be quite strong, because they are 
synergistic with “self-regarding” preferences. Cf. McAdams, supra note 20, at 414–15 (using the esteem-
theory of norms to explain how majorities “may impose their other-regarding preferences on minorities 
through norms, even when doing so is not efficient”). 
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level gives you a community of astronomers who have each invested 
significant resources in a particular research priority, and who each have 
strong psychological incentives to maintain the perception that this was the 
right course of action. It is easy to see how norms that operate to prevent 
others from adopting different research priorities become stringently 
enforced in these communities, to the potential detriment of innovation.230 
Though we focus here on how the status quo bias leads to the 
entrenchment and overenforcement of research priority norms, the same 
analysis applies to methodological and evaluation norms. Just as transition 
costs, loss aversion, regret avoidance, cognitive dissonance avoidance, and 
an irrational approach to sunk costs help explain why communities become 
reluctant to adopt new research priorities, so too do they help us understand 
why these same communities stick with established methodologies and 
evaluation norms. The short answer is that it is both physically and 
psychologically costly to do otherwise. 
3. Conformity Bias 
a. The bias 
The conformity bias describes a tendency to forego independent and 
autonomous decisionmaking in favor of following social norms.231 Everyday 
manifestations of the bias can be seen in humans’ shared propensity to wear 
the same style of clothing worn by their peers, frequent the same restaurants 
as them, listen to the music they listen to, and otherwise conform their 
behavior to the norms of their social group.232 
Although some of the social psychology literature equates the 
conformity bias with mere susceptibility to social influence, other scholars 
have pointed out that the bias is in fact a complex and multifaceted 
phenomenon.233 Under this more sophisticated view of conformity, the 
degree to which an actor conforms in any given situation will depend equally 
on the decision to be made and the goals of the decisionmaker.234 Broadly 
speaking, however, the tendency toward conformity has been empirically 
 
 230 An interesting question that has not yet been addressed by the empirical literature is whether 
members of certain communities are more prone to these psychological biases than others. For example, 
we might expect certain communities (e.g., attorneys) to attract people who are more risk averse while 
others (e.g., the visual arts) might attract people who are less risk averse. If this is in fact the case, it would 
influence our analysis, but further work is needed. 
 231 Divya Padalia, Conformity Bias: A Fact or Experimental Artifact?, 59 PSYCHOL. STUD. 223, 223 
(2014). 
 232 Mirre Stallen et al., Peer Influence: Neural Mechanisms Underlying In-Group Conformity, 
FRONTIERS HUMAN NEUROSCI., March 2013, at 1, 5. 
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 234 Id. at 226. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1112 
demonstrated over a swath of behaviors ranging from the commonplace to 
the criminal.235 
That said, conformity is not necessarily an undesirable characteristic. 
Indeed, evolution may have favored conformist behaviors because they 
contributed to humans’ survival.236 For one thing, conformity reduces 
information costs by harnessing the wisdom of the group.237 If a large number 
of people are acting in a particular way, a logical conclusion for any given 
individual considering a particular course of action is that the group’s 
behavior is safe or otherwise beneficial.238 The actor can thus use the group’s 
behavior as a heuristic for appropriate behavior without having to reinvent 
the wheel by researching various courses of action himself.239 
Conformity also plays an identity signaling role.240 Group membership 
carries with it numerous physical and psychological benefits, including 
protection, shared resources, validation of belief systems, a sense of self- 
worth, a sense of belonging, and the achievement of shared goals through 
collective action.241 One obvious way to signal belonging to a particular 
group is through conformity to that group’s norms and behaviors.242 
Yet while the conformity bias often produces tangible benefits, it can 
also at times lead people astray.243 In the creative fields, the tendency toward 
conformity can lead to anti-innovation norms. 
b. How the conformity bias leads to anti-innovation norms 
An understanding of conformity and its underlying mechanisms helps 
explain how research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms can 
become entrenched and overenforced in innovative communities. To 
illustrate, consider methodology norms. As we have explained, particular 
 
 235 Stallen et al., supra note 232, at 1 (stating that the bias has been observed even in situations where 
“identity signaling is not an issue,” such as energy conversation, and noting that policymakers have 
attempted—with mixed results—to harness the bias to curb antisocial behaviors like littering, drug use, 
and violence). 
 236 See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841, 843 (1994); 
Julie C. Coultas, When in Rome . . . An Evolutionary Perspective on Conformity, 7 GROUP PROCESSES & 
INTERGROUP REL. 317, 319 (2004) (hypothesizing that “conformity probably evolved as a cheap heuristic 
for selecting adaptive behaviour”). 
 237 See Coultas, supra note 236, at 319. 
 238 Id. 
 239 See id. at 318. 
 240 Stallen et al., supra note 232, at 1. 
 241 Megan L. Knowles & Wendi L. Gardner, Benefits of Membership: The Activation and 
Amplification of Group Identities in Response to Social Rejection, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1200, 1200 (2008); cf. HARDIN, supra note 26, at 77 (describing the “epistemological benefits” of 
group membership). 
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 243 See id. at 319 (discussing how conformity might lead to maladaptive behaviors generally). 
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creative groups often prioritize specific methodologies and reject others. 
Astronomers prioritized optic methods while rejecting radio astronomical 
methodologies,244 telephone companies were reluctant to look beyond their 
own methods to radio communication technologies,245 and Abstract 
Expressionists emphasized the creation of abstract and individualistic 
designs on unstretched and unprimed canvasses while resisting Pop-artists’ 
use of representational objects and pictures.246 How might a tendency toward 
conformity have contributed to these groups’ unwillingness to embrace 
different methodologies—a reluctance that delayed important creative 
advances? 
Consider, first, the information-cost-reducing function of conformity. 
Imagine you are a novice astronomer just beginning your graduate studies. 
Your uncommonly flexible supervisor gives you complete independence to 
devise your own research agenda, using whatever methodologies you see fit. 
Even assuming that practicalities like the availability of specific lab 
equipment pose no obstacle, it would not be surprising if you chose an 
agenda that made use of the optic methodology predominant in your field. 
Why? 
After reading the leading papers in the field, talking to colleagues, and 
doing the other necessary legwork, you likely (consciously or 
unconsciously) made an assumption. You assumed that the optic 
methodology used by your colleagues, the leaders in the field, and every 
other astronomer you had ever heard of, was the most productive—if not the 
only reasonable—course of action. In other words, you made use of the 
collective wisdom to reduce your own information costs. Although you did 
some research to reach this conclusion, you did not investigate all possible 
methodologies, study their pros and cons, etc. You saved yourself a lot of 
time and effort by relying on the conformity heuristic. If you represent the 
typical graduate student, it is easy to see how a social norm prioritizing a 
predominant research methodology quickly becomes entrenched in this way. 
Consider next the identity-signaling function of conformity. Now 
imagine that you are a young artist in the 1940s trying to break into the New 
York art scene. Your identity as an artist is not fully formed, but you 
recognize (consciously or unconsciously) the advantages of belonging to a 
group of like-minded creators—networking opportunities, mentorship, and 
a sense of belonging, to name a few. All the artists you know belong to the 
Abstract Expressionist school, and they all use specific methods in their 
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work: they all work on unstretched, unprimed canvasses, and they all 
emphasize abstract, individualistic expression. At the same time, they reject 
more realistic forms of expression; indeed, they seem to pride themselves on 
this rejection, as if their identity as artists depended on it. You want 
desperately to fit in with this group. What creative methodology will you 
likely choose? 
Of course, not every artist in the 1940s did choose to adopt the methods 
and ideology of the Abstract Expressionists,247 though many did. The point 
is not that everyone identifies with a particular group and adopts their 
methodologies in order to signal their membership with the group. Instead, 
it is that most people identify with some group and adopt the methodologies 
of that group, thereby entrenching group methodology norms. We would 
think it strange, for example, if an artist who was mentored by an Abstract 
Expressionist, spent most of his time with other Abstract Expressionists, 
attended Abstract Expressionist events, and so on, adopted primarily realist 
methodologies in his work. This is because the conformity bias operates on 
the peer or group level. Individuals conform their behaviors to those of their 
peer group: those whom they perceive as being similar to them and whom 
they identify with.248 
The same holds true for creative and scientific communities. An 
outsider might assume that all visual artists, or all scientific researchers 
working in the physical sciences would consider themselves as belonging to 
a unified group. This assumption would be wrong. Instead, creative 
personnel tend to identify with those they define as being within their 
 
 247 In fact, it was the coming together of diverse artists with alternative interests that eventually led 
to the Pop art and Minimalist movements. See id. at 25. 
 248 See, e.g., Marion Doull et al., Peer Support Strategies for Improving the Health and Well-Being 
of Individuals with Chronic Diseases, 3 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS. 1, 2 (2005) (defining 
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defined surprisingly narrowly. See Michael Shiner, Defining Peer Education, 22 J. ADOLESCENCE 555, 
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HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM (May 26, 2010), http://lifestyle.howstuffworks.com/family/parenting/tweens-
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“field”—often a surprisingly narrow concept.249 Researchers working in 
areas that might seem to an objective observer to be remarkably similar or 
logically related to another field are nonetheless considered outsiders by 
those on the inside.250 The infamous self-imposed divide among 
mathematicians, physicists, and engineers, for instance, is so clichéd that it 
has spawned its own series of mathematician-physicist-engineer jokes.251 
And even within the field of mathematics, the cultural gulf between “pure” 
and “applied” mathematicians is well-known.252 Each of these subgroups has 
its own shared language, holds its own scientific conferences, and abides by 
a distinct set of cultural and research norms.253 
The identity-signaling function of conformity helps us understand not 
only how methodology norms become entrenched but also how they become 
overenforced. This is in part because peer groups define themselves not only 
by what they are but also by what they are not. Thus, the young artist who 
aspires to the Abstract Expressionist school will choose not to adopt realist 
techniques in order to signal his identity. Further, the rest of the group will 
also work to prevent him from adopting these techniques. If he did so, it 
would dilute the group’s identity, which is based not only on the presence of 
abstract, individualistic expression but also on the absence of realism. Each 
member has an incentive to police the group’s other members to ensure the 
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 252 See, e.g., Aleksandar Makelov, Pure v. Applied, EXCLUDED MIDDLE (Feb. 15, 2016), 
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group identity remains intact. The group, concerned with identity and 
conformity, thus actively rejects alternative methodologies—radio 
astronomy in the case of astronomers, radio technology in the case of 
telephone engineers, and representational forms in the case of Abstract 
Expressionists—even when in hindsight, doing so will delay significant 
creative and innovative advances. 
The conformity analysis for methodology norms plays out similarly for 
research priority and evaluation norms. The information-cost- reducing and 
identity-signaling functions of conformity will lead groups to hew to specific 
research priority and evaluation norms even when departing from these 
norms would be socially beneficial. 
D. Theoretical Implications of Anti-Innovation Norms 
1. Free Riding vs Other Innovation Dilemmas 
It is now canonical to begin any exploration of IP and innovation law 
with a description of the problem of information as a “public good”—and 
the market failures that arise from the threat of free riding on others’ creative 
efforts.254 Free riding has become the central dogma of IP and innovation 
law. It has provided the basic explanatory framework to understand why 
governments must intervene in the markets for creative products and how to 
design such interventions. IP law itself, a key focus of legal scholars 
interested in innovation policy, is designed primarily to address free riding 
through time-limited property rights.255 But this singular focus on free 
riding—while perhaps justified more narrowly in the design of IP rights—
has biased scholarship on innovation policy more broadly. 
All of the studies on social norms and innovation synthesized in Part I 
focus almost exclusively on how creative communities rely on social norms 
to regulate copying behavior. The free-riding lens thus serves to frame the 
case studies, to focus the questions asked on one dilemma: how do innovator 
communities address the threat of copying? The studies’ conclusions are 
varied: in some cases, copying turns out not to be a threat at all; in others, 
social norms punish copying only when it comes too close to the original; 
yet in others, social norms punish copying of even general ideas.256 Yet, this 
focus on the regulation of copying behavior blinds this scholarship to other 
potential innovation dilemmas faced by innovator communities. 
Rather than focusing on free riding as a key impediment to innovation, 
our analysis of three anti-innovation norms (research priority, methodology, 
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and evaluation norms) reveals another crucial innovation dilemma: that of 
boundary-crossing. The dilemma can be framed as follows: many socially 
beneficial innovations require identifying and solving problems at the 
intersection of multiple innovator communities, but incentivizing and 
coordinating such collaboration is hampered by social norms that aim to 
preserve community boundaries. Inside a firm, this dilemma can be reframed 
as a team assembly and coordination dilemma arising from clashing research 
priorities, methodology, and evaluation norms of team members. 
Although our focus here is on boundary-preserving social norms, and 
the boundary-crossing innovation dilemmas that arise from them, this focus 
is not intended as an exhaustive list of the types of innovation dilemmas that 
these communities face. To the contrary, boundary-crossing is one of many 
additional innovation dilemmas that are obscured by the singular focus on 
free riding. In recent work, Brett Frischmann, Michael Madison, and 
Katherine Strandburg have called for a more systematic analysis of 
“knowledge commons”—which they define broadly as solutions to 
innovation dilemmas.257 Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg similarly 
recognize that “knowledge commons may confront diverse obstacles or 
social dilemmas, many of which are not well described or reducible to the 
simple free rider dilemma.”258 Among the important innovation dilemmas 
that these authors identify are infrastructure dilemmas (related to the 
construction of shared platforms and data-processing systems) and dilemmas 
related to the coordination of research when there is only a scattered market 
for innovations (such as research on orphan diseases or diseases that affect 
only the poor).259 Broadening our focus from free riding to other innovation 
dilemmas also highlights the limits of IP law to address them, inviting 
consideration of other, often neglected, policy interventions beyond IP law. 
Finally, an almost exclusive focus on free riding and on the ability of 
social norms to replace IP law has not only obscured other innovation 
dilemmas, it has also disconnected the emerging literature on IP and social 
norms from the broader literature on law and social norms. In contrast to the 
literature on IP and social norms, this broader literature has paid close 
attention to the dark side of social norms. Our analysis of the sociological 
and psychological bases of anti-innovation norms brings the literature on IP 
and social norms in conversation with this broader literature by showing how 
research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms can fit within the 
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interpretive framework developed by law and social norms scholars. It also 
advances this broader literature by providing a psychological explanation 
that expands upon the prevailing rational-choice and game-theoretical 
analyses. We expand on these two contributions below. 
2. Engaging and Expanding On the Broader Law and Social Norms 
Literature 
The broader literature on law and social norms, and in particular the 
work of Russell Hardin260 described above, explains that social norms that 
are welfare reducing for society at large (or “norms of exclusion”) often 
emerge because they are welfare enhancing for core members of particular 
social groups. Thus, in these models, socially harmful social norms emerge 
through the self-interested actions of core group members.261 As we 
summarized above, a key characteristic of “norms of exclusion” is that they 
are most commonly enforced upon marginal group members: they work by 
changing the interests of such marginal group members “to get them to act 
in conformity with the interests of the core of the group.”262 
Our description of anti-innovation norms fits quite well with this 
existing narrative in the broader field of law and social norms. Take, for 
example, the research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms that 
emerged in communities of astronomers that prioritized the optical 
exploration of the skies. Their maintenance can be explained in part as a 
result of competition for scarce resources—namely, public and private funds 
to carry out research related to outer space—between groups of optical 
astronomers and radio engineers. Indeed, a complementary line of inquiry in 
the sociology of expertise describes the interaction between distinct expert 
groups as one of constant competition for control over who gets to address 
and solve particular social problems.263 Similarly, several of the examples 
explored in Part II demonstrate how core community members of innovator 
communities, who helped develop and steer the community’s research 
priorities, methodology, and evaluation norms, enforce those norms onto 
marginal community members. In innovator communities, these marginal 
community members can often be trainees—this was indeed the case in the 
Abstract Expressionism community, where core, established group members 
enforced their group’s social norms on trainees who wished to adopt more 
realistic approaches to painting.264 
 
 260 HARDIN, supra note 26. 
 261 Id. at 72. 
 262 Id. 
 263 See, e.g., Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community 
Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 108 (2015) (synthesizing scholarship on expert communities). 
 264 CRANE, supra note 130, at 25. 
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Hardin formalized this explanation for the emergence of norms of 
exclusion as follows: 
1. F is an effect of X; 
2. F is beneficial for G; 
3. F maintains X by a causal feedback loop passing through G.265 
Here, F is a signal of group identification; X is the social norm at 
issue; and G are the members of the relevant social group. We can work 
out this formal representation with a particular example and illustrate how 
a particular social norm can become overenforced. 
Take X as the norm specifying the research priority of visual exploration 
of the skies, linked to the methodology norm of optical telescopy. Take F as 
a signal of group identification with astronomy arising from this norm. Take 
G as the members of astronomy innovation communities. The norm of the 
primacy of the optical exploration of the skies serves as a signal to identify 
“true” or “core” astronomists (Step 1). In turn, this signal benefits group 
members by leading to easier publication in peer-reviewed journals in 
astronomy, access to public and research funds, and more reputational 
benefits (Step 2). Identification with the research priority, methodology, and 
evaluation norms of the astronomy community thus maintains the norm of 
optics research priority through a causal feedback loop passing through the 
members of the relevant group. 
The key to understanding this feedback loop is to realize that core group 
members who strongly identify with the group are likely to spend more of 
their time in it than members who identify more loosely with the group. Core 
members will spend more time developing the research priorities, 
methodologies, and evaluation norms of the group.266 Hence, these norms are 
likely to become more extreme as time passes, not because the group as a 
whole desires this consequence but because of the individual incentives of 
the core members of the group. Note how this feedback loop strengthens 
these norms, led by the preferences of core group members, but is unrelated 
to the potential coordination benefits of research priority, methodology, and 
evaluation norms, serving simply as a signal of group membership—in effect 
leading to their overenforcement. 
In Posner’s signaling model, research priority, methodology, and 
evaluation norms also function as signals to other community members. But 
they do not signal group identity per se; rather, they provide evidence of 
being a hardworking, rigorous teammate—in other words, someone worth 
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collaborating with (a good type). Nevertheless, and as predicted by the 
signaling model, many marginal good types with idiosyncratic preferences 
will either subsume those preferences to send this signal or risk being 
shunned by their communities. In our case studies, those marginal members 
are likely individuals who are interested in unusual research problems or in 
unorthodox (or recombinant) methodologies. 
We can also view research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms 
through the lens of the esteem theory of norms. Introducing a desire for the 
esteem of others into a model of individual preferences can produce social 
norms that shift the preferences of marginal group members in socially 
harmful directions (or what McAdams and ourselves have called norm 
“overenforcement”). This is particularly the case if core community 
members who enforce these norms are high-status, while marginal members 
are low-status.267  
Our analysis adds to and deepens these models by providing a novel 
psychological account of the modeled behaviors. In other words, the broader 
sociology literature attempts to explain how norms emerge based on 
individuals’ behaviors, but it fails to give a full accounting of why individuals 
act as they do. The two psychological mechanisms we outlined in this Part—
the status quo and conformity biases—help fill this gap. 
For instance, due to the conformity bias, core group members—those 
who identify strongly with a particular group—have enhanced incentives to 
adopt and enforce the research priorities, methodologies, and evaluation 
norms of the group. Because these individuals’ personal identities are tied so 
closely to the identity of the group, the maintenance of these identities, and 
the psychological benefits that accrue from them, depend on robust norm 
enforcement.268 This strong enforcement by core members, in turn, gives 
peripheral members—those who may not identify quite as strongly with the 
group—a choice. They can either hew more closely to the norms being 
enforced by the core members or seek the tangible and psychological 
benefits that come with membership elsewhere—a different group for 
instance.269 Thus, an artist who is uncomfortable with the stringency of the 
norms being enforced by core Abstract Expressionists might seek the 
psychological benefits of group membership in another group like the 
Minimalists. Or, if he identifies more strongly with Abstract Expressionism 
than Minimalism, he might bite the bullet and adhere to the core Abstract 
 
 267 McAdams, supra note 20, at 416 (“The opinion of those who are highly esteemed tends to be 
valued more than the opinion of those who receive low esteem. Thus, high-status individuals will have 
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 268 See supra Section II.C.3.b. 
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Expressionists’ norms, even if they are more rigid than he would prefer. 
Either way, the norms become more extreme over time, as the models 
described above predict. 
The status quo bias also helps explain the behaviors of both core and 
peripheral group members in these models. Core members of groups are 
those who have spent significant time with the group. They are thus most 
likely to fall prey to the sunk cost fallacy and cognitive dissonance.270 This 
will cause them to resist any departure from established norms. Because they 
have spent the most time following these norms, the departure could be 
interpreted (by themselves or others) as an admission of previous failure.271 
For the same reason, i.e., to maintain the perception that their investments in 
a particular course of action were not wasted, these core members will 
enforce the norms on others in the group.272 
The peripheral members, for their part, have not invested as much time 
following particular norms as the core members, so they may be less subject 
to sunk cost and cognitive dissonance considerations. But they will still be 
swayed by loss aversion—the enhanced regret that comes when a failure 
results after a departure from accepted norms.273 A new astronomer, though 
she has not invested the same resources in optic methods as her older peers, 
may nevertheless worry about using radio techniques simply because she 
will be judged more harshly by these peers if this approach fails.274 When 
potential failures are weighted more heavily than potential successes, this 
might be enough to keep peripheral members from branching out. As 
peripheral members fall in line, they will themselves become subject to sunk 
cost and cognitive dissonance concerns, thereby moving closer to the core 
and further entrenching the norms of the group, as the functionalist model 
predicts. 
III. ANTI-INNOVATION NORMS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As discussed in Part I, the existing literature on social norms and 
innovation makes three main points. The first is that social norms can act as 
innovation enhancers by appropriating the traditional functions of IP law. As 
we demonstrated in Part II, however, this account is incomplete because it 
ignores the many instances in which social norms may hinder, rather than 
promote, innovative activities. 
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The second and third themes that emerge from the social norms and 
innovation literature concern the interaction between norms and IP law. 
Scholars have pointed out that IP law and social norms are interdependent, 
in the sense that IP has the potential to either enhance or reduce the 
innovation-promoting function of social norms.275 Relatedly, these scholars 
ask whether, given a choice, it is IP or social norms that present the best 
vehicle to foster innovation in any given context. While not incognizant of 
some potential downsides of social norms (like the unfair or nonuniform 
imposition of sanctions, or the potential for self-help measures to escalate 
into violence), they often answer this latter question by citing the relative 
advantages of social norms over formal IP law—advantages like reduced 
social costs and increased tailoring to the needs of particular innovative 
communities. 
In this Part, we expand the conversation beyond the IP/social norms 
dichotomy previously presented in the literature. We agree, in general, that 
IP can interact with innovation-enhancing social norms in either positive or 
negative ways. We also agree that based on the precise nature of this 
interaction in any given context we might choose whether we want a regime 
that relies on formal IP law, social norms, or some combination of the two. 
But, as our elucidation of anti-innovation norms illustrates, this debate 
ignores the fact that not all social norms that arise in innovative communities 
are innovation enhancing. Once we shift our focus from social norms-as-IP-
substitutes to a broader understanding of social norms that includes their 
anti-innovation features, it becomes evident that formal IP law, though it can 
do much to address anti-innovation norms, is also inherently limited in its 
ability to do so. This realization forces us out of a narrow IP-or-norms 
worldview and requires us to adopt a broader vision of innovation policy. 
We expand on that broader vision here. First, we ask what formal IP 
law might do to address anti-innovation norms. We conclude that it is a 
necessary, though not sufficient, tool. 
This leads us to this Article’s main theoretical insight: that the 
innovation literature, with its focus on either IP or substitutes for IP (like 
pro-innovation social norms) has been hindered by its narrow focus on 
solving the public goods (or free-rider) problem. Though addressing this 
problem is surely an important component of innovation policy, our 
elucidation of anti-innovation norms demonstrates that it should not be the 
only component. Indeed, the anti-innovation norms we have identified in this 
Article have little or nothing to do with the public goods problem formal IP 
law is designed to solve. 
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Instead, anti-innovation norms influence the types of innovation a 
particular individual or team is likely to undertake by hindering productive 
knowledge recombination across community boundaries. Rather than pose a 
free-rider problem, then, anti-innovation norms pose a boundary-crossing 
innovation dilemma.276 Because IP law is designed primarily to address the 
free-rider problem, it is unsurprising that it cannot fully correct anti-
innovation norms. In other words, strengthening IP protection will do little 
to change the background anti-innovation norms at work in a community, 
leading at best to more of the same type of innovation within a community277 
but failing to increase socially valuable boundary-crossing creativity. As we 
show in this Part, certain IP doctrines such as nonobviousness in patent law 
and attribution rights in copyright can work at the margins to impact the 
direction of innovative activity. Nevertheless, when anti-innovation norms 
are at work, IP (or its substitutes) will almost always be an insufficient 
intervention to correct them. Again, this prompts us to broaden our vision to 
consider other policy interventions—both private and public—to address 
anti-innovation norms. 
Taking the first steps in this direction, we offer some concrete policy 
solutions to the anti-innovation norms problem. Because creativity-
enhancing collaborations are risky and have large public benefits that cannot 
be fully internalized, we propose that public interventions are in order. We 
focus on novel funding regimes and tax credits as examples. We stress, 
however, that these proposals are preliminary in nature and should serve 
mainly to highlight the need for creative solutions that go beyond the narrow 
boundaries of IP. 
A. What IP Can—and Cannot—Do to Address Anti-Innovation Norms 
The IP system is generally understood as a means of efficiently 
incentivizing innovation.278 Under the traditional, utilitarian account of IP, 
exclusive rights are granted to creators to encourage them to create things 
which, for various reasons arising from the public goods nature of 
intellectual products, rational actors would not create otherwise.279 
 
 276 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 32, at 671 (criticizing “functionalist 
accounts” of IP for too myopic “a focus on excludability as a solution to public goods problems [which] 
can lead to isolated analysis of boundary problems”). 
 277 Increasing patent protection could also lead, at worst, to a decline in innovative output by 
weakening pro-innovation social norms and increasing hold up and patent thicket problems. 
 278 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
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But this corrective does not fully address the anti-innovation norms 
identified here. IP, designed as it is to solve the free-rider problem, is 
inherently limited in its ability to influence the social and psychological 
factors that contribute to anti-innovation norms. Though we and others have 
identified how the IP system might help tackle anti-innovation norms, an 
understanding of the limitations of IP also prompts us to widen our vision of 
what it takes to optimally incentivize innovation. 
1. IP’s Failure to Address the Causes of Anti-Innovation Norms 
As previously explained, IP is a market intervention designed to 
overcome the free-rider problems associated with creating intellectual 
products.280 The prospect of free riding undermines natural market incentives 
to invest in new intellectual goods;281 IP aims to restore these incentives by 
providing time-limited monopolies to those who create intellectual products, 
allowing them to charge supracompetitive prices for their products and 
recoup their investments.282 
This standard account of IP law sheds light on its inability to address 
anti-innovation norms. Put differently, the IP system is not designed to 
directly address the social structures of underlying technological 
communities. To the contrary, IP law is designed to increase the 
appropriability of those innovations such communities would routinely make 
were it not for the threat of free riding.283 The IP incentive, geared as it is 
towards encouraging the organization as a whole to invest more resources in 
creative projects generally, leaves it to the organization’s discretion to 
choose what types of projects to focus on. In fact, this is traditionally seen as 
a strength of IP law: IP rights’ reliance on decentralized market signals is 
thought to drive the efficient allocation of resources to inventive activity.284 
 
 280 See Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, supra note 50, at 169. 
 281 David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting 
Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 182 (2009). 
 282 See Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that IP 
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investments and risk” and to offset “the differential fixed costs borne by innovators and imitators”). 
 283 See, e.g., id. at 146 (explaining that traditional economic accounts of IP “emphasize a reward 
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 284 In comparative analyses of IP versus other regimes for incentivizing innovation such as 
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But these market signals are filtered through the existing technological 
environment, which is in turn bounded by anti-innovation norms. In other 
words, research priority, methodology, and evaluation norms constrain how 
communities perceive and respond to market signals. Conversely, consumer 
preferences—and the resulting market signals—are also limited by 
consumers’ abilities to articulate and recognize their own needs.285 In Lester 
and Piore’s case studies of boundary-crossing innovations such as cell phone 
technology, designer jeans, and medical devices, “interpretive” 
conversations across community boundaries were not guided by preexisting 
consumer preferences; rather, they served to articulate fuzzy consumer needs 
and even to create new ones by finding new problems or reframing old 
ones.286 
An organization with adequate incentives, courtesy of the patent 
system, to invest in research and development might still be reluctant to 
undertake innovation-enhancing collaborative projects because its 
decisionmakers are subject to the conformity and status quo biases.287 To be 
sure, this organization will continue to be guided by its own research, 
methodology, and evaluative norms to produce patentable and copyrightable 
innovations. Yet patent and copyright law do not provide incentives for the 
organization to challenge its own—often implicit and sometimes irrational—
anti-innovation norms and pursue other, more socially valuable innovations 
through boundary-crossing collaborations. Patent and copyright law take as 
a given the social and psychological constraints on innovation described in 
Part II. 
This point—that IP law cannot change a firm or a community’s 
underlying social and psychological constraints on innovation—echoes 
 
rely on market signals to ensure efficient channeling of research and development efforts towards 
innovations consumers actually want); Menell, supra note 42, at 143 (summarizing comparative 
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theories of firm behavior developed in evolutionary economics.288 Under 
evolutionary economic theories, firms are constrained in their “innovation 
possibilities” by their learning structures and routines.289 In turn, a firm’s 
learning structures and routines are cognitive concepts, “expressed in the 
minds of technologists and managers [and] . . . reflecting the individuals 
involved and the manner of their organization.”290 From this evolutionary 
perspective, the set of anti-innovation norms described in Part II—and their 
corresponding psychological maintenance mechanisms—serve to delineate 
a firm’s innovation possibilities. 
In applying evolutionary economics to technology policy, evolutionary 
economist J. S. Metcalfe divides policy incentives into two kinds: those that 
take a firm’s innovation possibilities as a given and those that seek to change 
them.291 Policy levers such as IP law that “increase the pay-off to innovation” 
by granting short-term monopoly profits fall squarely under the first 
category.292 The incentives currently provided by the IP system simply do 
not address underlying sociological and psychological constraints on 
innovation. 
Nor is it clear that IP, on its own, could fully do so. Because IP is 
focused on time-limited monopolies and financial incentives, reforms to IP 
doctrines, with the exceptions we explore below,293 may not have a 
significant long-term effect on anti-innovation norms. Specifically, 
economic analyses that explore how changes in patent and copyright law 
may impact the levels of research and development focus predominantly on 
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two features of IP rights: their breadth or scope and their length.294 Adjusting 
the length or breadth of IP rights alters the payoffs from obtaining IP 
protection, making innovation more or less appropriable. These changes do 
not, however, alter the underlying social norms that influence a firm’s 
innovation possibilities. 
2. What IP Can Do 
We have just explained why IP is ill-suited to comprehensively tackle 
anti-innovation norms. This is not to say, however, that IP cannot mitigate 
the detrimental effects of these norms. Indeed, we295 and others296 have 
detailed in other work how IP—as currently structured or with changes to its 
doctrines—may promote higher individual and team creativity. 
a. Attribution rights in copyright and patent law 
We have written elsewhere about how attribution promotes creativity. 
Indeed, giving appropriate credit where it is due has been empirically shown 
to lead to enhanced motivation for creative work,297 more creative outputs,298 
and increased desires to share research results.299 
The pro-creativity effects of attribution have implications for anti-
innovation norms as well. Because attribution promotes creativity in the 
ways identified, it can help creators overcome the status quo bias300 that 
constrains them to familiar research priority, methodology, and evaluation 
norms. And because it encourages sharing and disclosure behaviors, it can 
help promote boundary-crossing collaborations that might not otherwise 
occur. 
IP law has a potential role to play in giving creators appropriate credit. 
Copyright, for instance, which does not currently list actual authors in 
registration statements of works made for hire, could begin to do so as a way 
of providing some minimal attributional and reputational benefit to 
 
 294 See, e.g., Menell, supra note 42, at 139 (summarizing economic analyses of patent length and 
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creators.301 Patent law currently does require inventors to be named on the 
patent, even when the patent has been assigned to someone else, but options 
for making the attribution right in patent law more robust abound as well.302 
In previous work, for example, one of us proposed an attribution system 
patterned after the academic publishing model.303 Upon peer review, creative 
advances singled out for special attention would receive coverage in 
specialized outlets or the wider popular press.304 
b. Nonobviousness doctrine in patent law 
In patent law, the nonobviousness doctrine seeks to reward with a patent 
only those inventions that would not have occurred (or would have been 
significantly delayed) absent a patent incentive.305 In other words, 
nonobviousness seeks to identify those inventions for which the prospect of 
free riding would be most detrimental. Both economic and social theories of 
nonobviousness view this doctrine as a mechanism to increase risk-taking by 
innovators and firms by encouraging investment in projects whose success 
is uncertain at the outset.306 Absent a nonobviousness doctrine, firms and 
individuals would be incentivized to invest in “low-hanging fruit”—those 
very incremental innovations requiring little investment, little creativity, and 
small inventive leaps leading to predictable results.307 
The nonobviousness doctrine raises the bar. It tells inventors: to obtain 
a patent you must do something other than take the next incremental step in 
your particular technological domain. For this reason, nonobviousness is 
uniquely suited as a policy lever to mitigate anti-innovation norms. Investing 
in boundary-crossing innovation involves social and economic risks: 
flouting a community’s research priority, methodology, and evaluation 
norms could lead to loss of status, loss of group membership, and loss of all 
the pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits associated with such group status 
and membership.308 In previous work, one of us proposed that the 
nonobviousness doctrine should encourage the specific risks involved in 
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boundary-crossing collaboration.309 It could do so by evaluating whether the 
invention at issue resulted from the recombination of knowledge from distant 
technological domains.310 Recombination of distant knowledge domains 
could serve as strong indicia of nonobviousness.311 Conversely, inventions 
that recombine knowledge from domains that are routinely brought together 
would merit more intense scrutiny.312 
But, even if adopted, these proposals to modify the nonobviousness 
doctrine would only work on an innovator who is both weakly influenced by 
anti-innovation norms and strongly influenced by patent law. We can more 
formally define such an innovator as one who, without a nonobviousness 
standard that favors boundary-crossing, is equally as likely to pursue 
boundary–crossing innovations as not.313 Such an innovator is likely an 
innovator who, for a number of reasons, is on the outskirts of a particular 
innovator community or already has ties with more than one innovator 
community and thus is weakly bounded by any particular community’s anti-
innovation norms. Perhaps she is a maverick and has a personality that likes 
to flout convention; or perhaps she is a misfit whose ideas are routinely 
rejected by core group members.314 To this inventor, a new nonobviousness 
standard that rewards boundary-crossing may nudge her to resist anti-
innovation norms and engage in boundary-crossing research. 
Consider, however, that the ability to obtain a patent is one of many 
elements innovators and firms take into account when choosing among 
research projects.315 Further, mounting empirical evidence casts doubt on 
whether patent incentives play any role in incentivizing inventor and firm 
behavior in a variety of industries.316 In those fields where inventors are not 
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at 756 (citing HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963)). 
 315 See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (finding that patents “tend to be the [mechanism] least emphasized by 
firms in the majority of manufacturing industries” to protect their investment in innovation); Lemley, 
supra note 11. 
 316 See Lemley, supra note 11, at 1332–35. 
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incentivized by patents, changing the obviousness standard will not affect 
maverick or misfit behavior. And in those fields where patents do play some 
role in guiding inventor behavior, for the vast majority of inventors and 
firms, the nonobviousness doctrine is likely to only influence the choice of 
research projects among the bounded universe of projects within a particular 
community’s research priorities, methodology, and evaluation norms. From 
a patent-centric perspective, it is certainly efficiency enhancing to tweak the 
nonobviousness doctrine to nudge this patent-induced marginal inventor 
towards boundary-crossing projects. But from a broader innovation policy 
perspective, a more comprehensive toolkit is needed to address anti-
innovation norms. 
c. Fair use doctrine in copyright law 
Though we have not explored the potential for fair use to address anti-
innovation norms in other work, we believe it is worth mentioning here.317 
The fair use doctrine provides a defense to copyright infringement318 based 
on four factors.319 The first of these factors asks about “the purpose and 
character of the use,”320 including whether the infringing use is 
“transformative.”321 In an empirical study, Matthew Sag found that whether 
a work is deemed transformative plays a critical role in determining whether 
an infringing use will be deemed “fair” by the courts.322 
To counter anti-innovation norms, the transformative inquiry could 
more explicitly take into account some of the concerns we discuss here. 
Courts could consider whether an infringing work was the kind of work that 
tends to be underproduced due to anti-innovation norms. If the infringer 
transported her use of the original across a boundary—from one community 
of artists to another, or from one medium to another, for example—a finding 
of transformativeness would be more likely to obtain. The goal, of course, 
would be to encourage this type of socially beneficial creation by minimizing 
liability for those who engage in it. These types of considerations may 
 
 317 We also hope to expand on these ideas in future work. 
 318 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of 
copyright.”). 
 319 Id. (listing as fair use factors: “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”). 
 320 Id. 
 321 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (stating that an 
infringing work is considered transformative if it “alter[s] the [infringed work] with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”). 
 322 See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 76 (2012). 
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already be present in the transformativeness inquiry to some extent,323 but an 
understanding of the anti-innovation norm dynamic justifies a more explicit 
and principled approach. 
d. Patents as boundary objects 
Apart from any particular IP doctrine, Dan Burk has argued that the 
patent document itself may act as a “boundary object” that facilitates 
communication and collaboration among disparate communities.324 
According to Burk, the patent succeeds in this function in part because its 
language is precise enough to speak to multiple communities yet ambiguous 
enough to allow it “to maintain different identities in different social 
worlds.”325 These features “provide a point of commonality where disparate 
communities can collaborate and where contested meanings can be 
negotiated[,] . . . facilitat[ing] communication and cooperation between 
social domains.”326 In her study of physician–inventors, Katherine 
Strandburg has also identified a role for patents as boundary-crossing devices 
that facilitated collaboration between physicians and device industry 
engineers.327 Thus, patents may serve a structural function—enabling 
collaboration between different communities of innovators. On the other 
hand, patents may interfere with boundary-crossing collaboration in 
communities that adopt open-innovation models. As Clark Asay has argued, 
patents favor centralized innovation and may place the type of decentralized 
and modular innovation that takes place in open communities at a 
disadvantage.328 
B. Policy Prescriptions: The Potential of a More Robust Innovation Policy 
Although the preceding discussion makes clear that IP can do much to 
tackle anti-innovation norms, it should be equally clear that it cannot fully 
solve the dilemma. Here, we discuss additional policy levers that could be 
deployed to address the anti-innovation norms we have identified. As 
 
 323 See, e.g., Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix, Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that a video game emulator was transformative despite “similarit[ies] of uses and function” with 
the original because it created a new platform for game play). 
 324 Burk, supra note 296, 1623–24. 
 325 Id. at 1628. 
 326 Id. at 1624. 
 327 Strandburg, supra note 61, at 76. 
 328 Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 MD. L. REV. 431, 432–37 (2015). Patents may 
also entrench the status quo bias: the holder of a patent that has market power may be disincentivized 
from searching for improvements, “as she already enjoys a dominant position in the relevant market, and 
the improved version might not generate new demand but rather take sales away from the original 
product.” Ofer Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in Patent Law: Making Sense of Incentives, 50 IDEA 
723, 734 (2010). 
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explained, the sociological and psychological barriers to creativity-
enhancing collaborations make it unlikely that creative teams will engage in 
these endeavors on their own. Further, the benefits that accrue to the public 
from these collaborations (in the form of socially beneficial groundbreaking 
innovation, the establishment of new lines of research, etc.) cannot be fully 
internalized by the private parties that engage in them. And because the 
innovation incentives that IP offers are agnostic as to the type of innovation 
that occurs, private parties are much more likely to engage in less risky and 
psychologically taxing (but also less socially beneficial) lines of research that 
promise the same private benefits. For these reasons, legal interventions that 
offer private incentives to engage specifically in creativity-enhancing 
collaborative research are in order. We now discuss two of these: novel 
funding regimes and tax incentives. 
1. Collaborative Team Grants 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) are the primary governmental funding agencies for 
scientific research in the United States. As such, they provide much of the 
funding, in the form of grants, for biomedical and public health research 
conducted at universities and research institutes throughout the country.329 Its 
counterpart in the arts is the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).330 
Although several existing NIH grants are designed to encourage 
collaboration, none of them target the formation of boundary-crossing teams 
that are so crucial to innovation and that anti-innovation norms discourage. 
Rather, current NIH initiatives designed to foster collaboration are focused 
more extensively on big data collection and annotation. Big data analysis is 
often more about constructing a shared infrastructure for data analysis and 
coordinating its collection than it is about generating new and innovative 
ideas. Indeed, many of these projects “involve application of known methods 
on a large scale to an important problem.”331 Similarly, the NEA funds 
individual fields, such as dance, design, visual arts, music, literature, and 
theatre, but does not currently emphasize collaboration across them.332 The 
 
 329 NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov [https://perma.cc/YS83-36DC]; NAT’L SCI. BOARD, 
https://www.nsf.gov/nsb [https://www.nsf.gov/nsb]. See generally W. Nicholson Price II, Grants (draft 
on file with author) (providing an in-depth examination of the NIH grant system as an innovation-lever). 
 330 See NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS, https://www.arts.gov [https://perma.cc/KVE8-563L]. 
 331 Ronald N. Germain, Healing the NIH-Funded Biomedical Research Enterprise, 161 CELL 1485, 
1489 (2015) (emphasis added); see also Bruce Alberts et al., Rescuing US Biomedical Research from Its 
Systemic Flaws, 111 PNAS 5773, 5776 (2014) (“To combat the tendency for fields to become parochial, 
agencies should develop funding mechanisms that encourage the growth of new fields, both by direct 
support for new science and by a rigorous regular evaluation of existing programs.”). 
 332 See Grants, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS, https://www.arts.gov/grants 
[https://perma.cc/F4KQ-EZEV]. 
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NSF funds a broader range of boundary-crossing opportunities under their 
targeted “solicited interdisciplinary programs.”333 These grant opportunities 
target research areas, such as BigData, Macrosystems Biology, and Regional 
Climate Prediction, that the NSF identifies as priority funding areas.334 
Nevertheless, unsolicited interdisciplinary proposals are likely to face 
hurdles to receiving NSF funding similar to those facing NIH proposals 
because, as the NSF itself recognizes, “there might not be an obvious natural 
[core program] ‘home’ for every interdisciplinary proposal.”335 
One possibility for overcoming anti-innovation norms, then, is to 
introduce a grant mechanism at the NIH, NEA, and NSF that requires 
collaboration across boundaries. At the NIH and NSF, such a mechanism 
could solicit proposals from researchers from any disciplinary background 
to research intractable problems whose solution requires the insights and 
joint work of multiple technological domains. The grant could also be 
expanded to include proposals from industry or industry–academia 
initiatives (public–private partnerships) that specifically engage multiple 
research communities and disciplines.336 Indeed, the NIH did enact, for a 
period of seven years, a set of grants (the “Roadmap Grants”) that sought to 
encourage the assembly of boundary-crossing teams.337 The Roadmap Grant 
project was tethered to the “Common Fund”—a discretionary pool of funds 
that each successive NIH Director can use to shape science policy during her 
tenure.338 Currently, there is no grant equivalent to the NIH Roadmap Grant 
for Interdisciplinary Research. Under several measures, however, the 
Roadmap Grant project was very successful and worth replicating on a larger 
scale.339 In other work, for example, we detail how the Roadmap Grant 
facilitated research in the novel area of “oncofertility,” which deals with the 
fertility issues of cancer patients.340 These prescriptions are also relevant to 
other grant-making agencies both in science and technology and in the arts, 
 
 333 See How Does NSF Support Interdisciplinary Research?, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 
https://www.nsf.gov/od/oia/additional_resources/interdisciplinary_research/support.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/5ZSZ-PXQ9]. 
 334 Id. 
 335 Id. 
 336 See, e.g., Liza S. Vertinsky, Patents, Partnerships, and the Pre-Competitive Collaboration Myth 
in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1509, 1526 (2015). 
 337 See NIH Roadmap and Roadmap-Affiliated Initiatives, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, 
https://www.niehs.nih.gov/funding/grants/announcements/roadmap/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/LT8Y-
8C59]. 
 338 Id. 
 339 Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration, supra note 15 at 8. 
 340 Id. at 22–25. 
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such as the NSF, the Department of Defense, and the NEA, as well as private 
grant-making institutions.341 
To optimally design such a grant, grant-making agencies or institutions 
should create stand-alone bodies specifically tasked with coordinating these 
new grants and with researching effective team management practices. 
Otherwise, existing bodies within these organizations given jurisdiction over 
the grants may find themselves subject to the very same anti-innovation 
norms (prioritizing specific research goals, methodologies, and evaluation 
norms dictated by their preexisting agendas) the grant mechanism is 
designed to overcome.342 The grants should also be administered with a 
conscious degree of flexibility. A flexible approach aligns best with the type 
of high-risk, uncertain research the grants are meant to foster. Grant 
reviewers should allow some deviation from a team’s original proposal, 
provided the overall subject matter of the research fits with the problem to 
be addressed by the team.343 
2. Tax Credits for Collaborative Research Involving       
Nontraditional Teams 
Another mechanism by which the government may directly incentivize 
the type of collaborative research discouraged by anti-innovation norms is 
through tax incentives. Currently, tax incentives in the United States, in 
contrast to those of other countries with intensive research and development 
industries, are generic—they enable firms to deduct any research and 
development costs. Precisely because tax credits are generic, any uniform 
increase in tax subsidies is likely to lead to a dynamic misallocation of 
resources by oversubsidizing research avenues dictated by anti-innovation 
norms while doing nothing to discourage underinvestment in 
interdisciplinary collaborative projects.344 To correct this distortion, the 
United States could adopt a special type of tax credit requiring nontraditional 
collaboration between industries that specialize in different technical 
 
 341 One private initiative that is structured to encourage boundary-crossing collaboration is the 
research center “Janelia Farms” funded by the Howard Hughes Research Institute. Janelia Farms’ 
philosophy is to fund “risky, long-term projects that may often fall outside the realm of most funding and 
academic goals. [These projects] bring together myriad disciplines – perhaps combining physicists, 
computer scientists and biologists to build a new microscope. It’s not necessarily what you’d find in a 
university biology department.” Janelia’s Philosophy, JANELIA RES. CAMPUS, 
https://www.janelia.org/janelia-philosophy [https://perma.cc/TBQ5-75BV]. Janelia Farms research has 
been successful in generating Nobel Prize-winning science in just eleven years of operation. Id. 
 342 See, e.g., Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 263. 
 343 Pedraza-Fariña, Constructing Interdisciplinary Collaboration, supra note 15, at 34–35. 
 344 See, e.g., Daniel J. Wilson, Beggar Thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-of-State, and Aggregate 
Effects of R&D Tax Credits, 91 REV. ECON. STAT. 431 (2009). 
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domains (a cross-technology tax credit).345 The tax credit could be designed 
so that it is available for a limited number of years per collaborative project. 
Many other countries currently have a collaborative tax credit available 
to industries, and the design of the U.S. cross-technology tax credit could 
begin by looking to these models for initial guidance. For example, Belgium, 
Denmark, Japan, and France provide tax credits for industries collaborating 
in the development of products with universities or research institutes (thus 
fostering clinical/industrial-basic research collaboration).346 Canada provides 
a tax credit for all companies collaborating with eligible universities, 
research institutes, or research consortia.347 Most of these tax credits focus 
on one particular type of collaboration: that between basic science and 
clinical/industrial communities. A tax credit for joint ventures between 
industries in different technological environments is another possibility. 
The advantage of a collaborative tax credit over collaborative team 
grants is that it obviates the need for an expert panel—with all of its built-in 
biases—to decide ex ante which projects are and are not worth funding. 
Collaborative tax credits represent a uniform push towards collaborative 
research. Of course, the uniformity of the incentive can also dull its impact, 
since it cannot identify and target those projects likely to be more socially 
significant. 
CONCLUSION 
The turn to social norms in IP scholarship signals an important shift in 
legal scholars’ understanding of innovation dynamics. By challenging the 
dominant narratives that placed IP rights at the center of innovation policy, 
social norms have come to represent the promise of informal, low-cost 
incentives. 
But this line of scholarship has two important blind spots. First, it 
remains shackled to overly narrow notions of innovation dilemmas that 
privilege free riding as the central problem facing innovators. Second, it 
neglects to fully explore social norms’ potential dark side. 
This Article describes types of social norms that, rather than take the 
place of IP as an innovation incentive, serve to delay innovation. We term 
these types of social norms anti-innovation norms. 
 
 345 Although a comprehensive discussion of selection criteria is beyond the scope of this Article, 
potential signals that a project is boundary-crossing might include the fact that a project brings together 
people who work in different traditionally-defined scientific disciplines or who use different 
methodological approaches. 
 346 See, e.g., Robert D. Atkinson, Expanding the R&E Tax Credit to Drive Innovation, 
Competitiveness and Prosperity, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 617, 617–28 (2007). 
 347 Id. 
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Through our analysis of anti-innovation norms, we make three main 
theoretical contributions to both IP and innovation theory, and to the field of 
law and social norms more broadly. First, the set of anti-innovation norms 
described in this Article is unconnected to the free-rider problem. Our 
account thus challenges the dominant free-riding dogma in traditional IP 
narratives, which views the threat of copying as the most important 
innovation dilemma to be addressed through governmental interventions. 
Second, shifting our focus from free riding to other innovation dilemmas also 
highlights the limits of IP law to address them. Although changes in IP 
doctrines, such as attribution rights in copyright law and the nonobviousness 
doctrine in patent law, can address anti-innovation norms to some extent, IP 
law cannot provide a comprehensive solution. Third, our account of social 
norms is the first to merge macrolevel (sociological) and microlevel 
(psychological) accounts of how social norms emerge and are maintained. 
We thus expand upon existing analyses of norm emergence predominant in 
the broader law and social norms scholarship. In so doing, we bring IP and 
social norms literature into the conversation with the broader field of law and 
social norms, a field that has long grappled with social norms’ potential 
detrimental effects on society. 
 
